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VOTER PRIMACY 
Sarah C. Haan* 
 
This Article argues that Citizens United v. FEC expanded the audience 
for campaign finance disclosure to include a group that had never before 
been held relevant to campaign finance disclosure—corporate 
shareholders—and explores the constitutional, policy, and political 
consequences of this change.  In part IV of Citizens United, the U.S. 
Supreme Court departed from more than thirty years of campaign finance 
disclosure analysis to treat corporate shareholders as a target audience for 
corporate electoral spending disclosure, holding that the governmental 
interest advanced by campaign finance disclosure laws includes an interest 
in helping corporate shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s 
political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits.”  
Commentators have failed to appreciate the significance of this part of the 
opinion, which was joined by eight of the Court’s nine Justices. 
The Court’s expansion of the audience for compelled corporate 
campaign finance disclosure is unlikely to lead to expanded disclosure; to 
the contrary, it is likely to result in less disclosure of corporate political 
spending, and particularly in less disclosure that is useful to voters.  To 
explain why, this Article compares voters’ and shareholders’ informational 
interests in corporate campaign finance disclosure.  It then explores 
potential consequences of the Court’s move to repurpose corporate 
campaign finance disclosure to serve the informational needs and interests 
of shareholders.  After Citizens United, the main governmental interest that 
can justify campaign finance disclosure laws is an informational interest, 
and several Justices on the current Supreme Court believe that voters lack 
legitimate informational interests in some kinds of electoral spending 
disclosure.  Shareholder informational interests offer an alternative 
justification for laws that compel disclosure by corporate electoral 
spenders.  In the coming years, the Court’s assessment of the relative merits 
of voters’ and shareholders’ interests in disclosure information may well 
determine the form and content of that disclosure.  By clarifying the 
differences between a “voter primacy” and a “shareholder primacy” 
approach to corporate spending disclosure, this Article lays bare the 
consequences of choosing one over the other. 
 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.  I would like to thank 
Richard Seamon and participants in the 2014 National Business Law Scholars Conference, 
the 2014 Inland Northwest Junior Scholars Conference, and the 2014 Rocky Mountain 
Junior Scholars Conference for their valuable feedback on early drafts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In corporate law, “shareholder primacy” describes the theory that a 
corporation best achieves its objectives through mechanisms, like 
shareholder voting, that ensure the preeminence of shareholder interests.1  
Shareholder primacy began as an economic idea about capital formation 
and risk2 and has grown over several decades into a broader ideology about 
whose interests should dominate the corporate enterprise.3  Today, virtually 
 
 1. See, e.g., Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535 (2006) (defining it as the “view that managers’ 
fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and preclude them from 
giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies”); Lynn A. Stout, 
Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 
(2002) (defining it as “the view that the corporation exists only to make money for its 
shareholders”). 
 2. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 67–70 (1991). 
 3. For a recent example, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (holding that shareholders’ religious preferences control the corporation’s religious 
“exercise” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
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all questions of corporate and securities law are evaluated by lawmakers, 
regulators, and courts through a shareholder primacy lens.4 
An analogous principle exists in the legal framework governing political 
elections.  In this Article, I call this principle “voter primacy.”  Voter 
primacy is the idea that representative democracy best achieves its 
objectives through mechanisms that give primacy to voters’ interests.5  
Lawmakers, regulators, and courts have long understood voters to stand at 
the center of the democratic enterprise and elections to facilitate voters’ 
crucial role in political self-determination.  In the same way that corporate 
law’s purpose is to maximize shareholder value, the purpose of election law 
is, first and foremost, to facilitate and effectuate the sovereignty of the 
people. 
From the very origin of campaign finance disclosure laws, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis took for granted that campaign 
finance disclosure is for voters.  Public disclosure of campaign finance 
information is justified, the Court has written, because disclosure is useful 
to voters.6  It helps voters decide how to vote, and it helps them monitor 
elected officials for evidence of improper influence after they are elected. 
However, in 2010, in Citizens United v. FEC,7 the Supreme Court 
departed from its longstanding voter primacy approach to campaign finance 
disclosure.  When challenged on First Amendment grounds, campaign 
finance disclosure laws are subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires 
that a disclosure law be justified by a “sufficiently important” governmental 
interest.8  Disclosure of outside spending—the only type of federal electoral 
spending that a corporation can engage in—can be justified mainly by an 
informational interest, and whether a particular disclosure law serves a 
sufficiently important informational interest turns, under the Court’s 
approach, on the value of the compelled disclosure to its audience.  The 
identity of the audience for a campaign finance disclosure law is integral to 
the constitutional analysis of the law.  Until Citizens United, campaign 
finance disclosure had only voters as an audience, and thus the essential 
constitutional question concerned the value of information disclosed to 
voters, and to voters alone. 
In part IV of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United, the 
Court expanded the audience to include a second interest group, corporate 
shareholders.  The majority opinion devoted nearly as much analysis to 
shareholders’ informational interests in corporate electoral spending 
disclosure as it did to voters’ interests.  In fact, the passage on this subject 
mentioned shareholders’ and voters’ informational interests precisely the 
 
 4. Shareholder primacy is not without its critics. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:  HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
 5. These mechanisms include the First Amendment’s protection of a listener-focused 
marketplace of ideas. 
 6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976). 
 7. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 8. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65–66. 
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same number of times, and shareholders’ interests were listed ahead of 
voters’ interests twice, while voters’ interests were listed ahead of 
shareholders’ interests only once.9  A careful textual analysis of the Court’s 
language suggests that the Citizens United majority viewed shareholders’ 
informational interests in corporate electoral spending disclosure as nearly 
as important as, if not equal to, those of voters. 
The idea that campaign finance disclosure has, as a primary or even a 
secondary purpose, the provision of a corporation’s financial information to 
its shareholders, is a significant departure from the way that lawmakers, 
regulators, and courts have long thought about the First Amendment 
interests at stake in compelled campaign finance disclosure.  In fact, in its 
arguments defending the disclosure laws challenged in Citizens United, the 
government never argued that the disclosure laws were justified in part by 
shareholder informational interests.10 Neither of the parties mentioned 
shareholders as an audience for campaign finance disclosure, probably 
because the idea had no basis in the Court’s prior disclosure jurisprudence.  
The Court appears to have acted on its own to identify a governmental 
interest in the use of campaign finance disclosure to inform investors about 
corporate spending, possibly borrowing selectively and without attribution 
from an amicus curiae brief submitted in the case.11 
The Court’s expansion of the constitutionally cognizable audience for 
corporate electoral spending disclosure to include shareholders is a threat to 
voter primacy and the democratic values that voter primacy embodies.  This 
is because the expansion of the audience for corporate electoral spending 
disclosure is unlikely to provide a basis for expanding corporate electoral 
spending disclosure itself; to the contrary, the recognition of shareholder 
interests in corporate electoral spending disclosure is likely to justify a 
decrease in corporate electoral spending disclosure, and particularly a 
decrease in corporate disclosure that is useful to voters.  Essentially, 
Citizens United has undermined voter primacy by repurposing this type of 
campaign finance disclosure to serve two competing audiences. 
Moreover, because corporate shareholders as a group share certain 
demographic characteristics that distinguish them from voters as a group, 
the Court’s expansion of the audience for corporate electoral spending 
disclosure is likely to have political consequences.  For instance, it may 
enhance political power for the very wealthy, since corporate shareholding 
is strongly concentrated in top income groups.  In addition, it may cause 
geographic effects in state and local elections, because politically active 
public companies are likely to have many more shareholders who are voting 
citizens of certain communities than others.  These political effects can be 
predicted because a nexus exists between the identity of those whose 
interests campaign finance disclosure laws are designed to serve and the 
 
 9. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–71. 
 10. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 11. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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identity of those who can use disclosure most effectively to advance their 
political interests. 
What is more, the Court’s move to expand the audience for corporate 
electoral spending disclosure may ultimately undercut the constitutional 
basis for campaign finance spending disclosure that provides “source 
revelation” to voters.12  Source revelation involves public disclosure of the 
identities of those who provide financial support to a candidate for public 
office.  Since the earliest disclosure laws were written, campaign finance 
disclosure has been understood to be valuable to voters because it allows 
them to draw conclusions about a candidate from the identities of those who 
give her financial support.13  The Court’s endorsement of source revelation 
in Buckley v. Valeo14 reflected its normative view that voters should draw 
such conclusions.15  Today, disclosure opponents reject source revelation 
and argue that voters should make voting decisions based upon the merits 
of the candidates’ positions rather than upon the identity of their 
supporters.16 
In Citizens United and subsequent cases, the five-Justice majority has 
signaled only weak support for voter interests in disclosure based on source 
revelation, and some of those five Justices have disavowed source 
revelation altogether.17  This suggests that shareholder informational 
interests, which are not based on source revelation, provide the only 
common basis for justifying corporate campaign finance disclosure, and 
thus may take on increased analytical importance.  Shareholder 
informational interests are not based on source revelation because 
shareholders do not care about the identities of a particular candidate’s 
financial backers; they want to know what a specific corporation is doing 
with its money.  Any shift in the balance of interests that justify corporate 
electoral spending disclosure away from voters’ interests in source 
revelation in favor of shareholders’ interests in financial oversight has a 
meaningful consequence.  If corporate electoral spending data ever became 
available through a different disclosure channel—for example, through 
federal securities regulation—a key governmental interest justifying 
campaign finance disclosure of corporate expenditures would become 
vulnerable to challenge as costly and redundant. 
The Court’s disclosure analysis in Citizens United must be understood as 
part of a broader trend related to corporate disclosure.  In this trend, 
securities disclosure, which traditionally has been investor focused, 
 
 12. See Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information 
Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1863 (2013) (coining the phrase “source revelation”). 
 13. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67. 
 14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 15. See id. at 66–67. 
 16. See, e.g., Benjamin Barr & Stephen R. Klein, Publius Was Not a PAC:  Reconciling 
Anonymous Political Speech, the First Amendment, and Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 
WYO. L. REV. 253, 285 (2014) (suggesting that “an organization’s desire for the public to 
focus solely on its message is more important than the public’s interest in knowing who is 
behind it”). 
 17. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 238–39 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2660 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
increasingly is being used to provide information to the general public.18  
Securities law commentators have recently raised concerns about the 
repurposing of investor-focused disclosure for other audiences,19 and SEC 
Chairwoman Mary Jo White has suggested that securities disclosure should 
not stray from its “core purpose”:  providing investors with information 
useful for investment decision making.20  At the same time, other disclosure 
laws—like campaign finance disclosure laws—are being reimagined as 
channels for provision of investor information.  In all cases, a change in the 
disclosure audience has significant implications for the content and manner 
of disclosure, and ultimately for the value of the disclosure for all potential 
audiences. 
Election-related disclosure laws mandate, among other things, 
registration and termination filings, recordkeeping, disclaimers, reporting, 
and public disclosure.  Registration and termination requirements obligate a 
subject to register its identity and/or intentions with the government.  
Recordkeeping rules require a subject to maintain financial and other 
records that may be audited or examined by the government.  Disclaimer 
requirements mandate that a subject identify itself as the source or author of 
an ad in the ad itself.  Reporting laws compel the subject to report 
information about itself or its donors—including contribution and 
expenditure figures—to the government. 
Disclosure of corporate outside spending (independent expenditures and 
electioneering communications) reveals how much a corporation has spent 
to support or oppose an electoral cause.  In some state and local elections, 
corporations also may make donations directly to candidates 
(“contributions” in the jargon of election law).  This Article uses the term 
“corporate electoral spending disclosure” to include both categories of 
corporate spending.  By the Supreme Court’s logic in Citizens United, any 
sort of campaign finance disclosure that reveals the amount of money spent 
by a corporation in an electoral contest or ballot initiative would advance 
the informational interests of the corporation’s shareholders. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes how, in the lead-up 
to Citizens United, the parties in election law disputes and the Supreme 
Court itself spent more than thirty years analyzing the government’s 
informational interest in campaign finance disclosure as if it involved the 
provision of information exclusively to voters.  Part I then shows how the 
 
 18. Examples include:  the Board Diversity Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2013); 
the proposed CEO-Pay Ratio Rule, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903–04 (2010); the Resource 
Extraction Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13q-1 (2013); the Conflict Minerals Rule, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13p-1 (2013); and the Mining Safety Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 229.104 (2013). 
 19. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflicts Minerals Legislation:  The SEC’s New Role As 
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2012) (arguing 
that the Conflict Minerals Rule “will force companies to provide nonmaterial information to 
investors and the public,” and thus “is problematic from both a securities law standpoint and 
a public international law standpoint”). 
 20. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure, The Harvard Law 
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Oct. 15, 2013), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806#.VNk0ZVPF9XZ. 
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Court’s controversial 2010 opinion in Citizens United broke from this 
precedent to treat corporate shareholders as a constitutionally cognizable 
audience for campaign finance disclosure for the first time.  It analyzes the 
key disclosure passage in the majority opinion, and makes some guesses 
about where the Court’s ideas about shareholder informational interests in 
campaign finance disclosure originated—considering that no party in the 
case had raised or discussed the idea.  It describes how Citizens United and 
subsequent cases have weakened voters’ informational interests in source 
revelation, which is likely to mean that future governmental justifications 
for corporate electoral spending disclosure will rely more heavily on 
shareholders’ informational interests.  Finally, Part I describes how the 
Court’s endorsement of a shareholder audience for campaign finance 
disclosure in Citizens United has influenced legislatures’ and courts’ views 
about the purpose of campaign finance disclosure since the case was 
decided, and argues that this threatens to meaningfully change the way that 
we understand what corporate campaign finance disclosure is supposed to 
do. 
Part II contends that the Court’s endorsement of a new shareholder 
audience for corporate campaign finance disclosure is not likely to lead to 
more disclosure; to the contrary, it is likely to result in less corporate 
disclosure, and particularly less disclosure that is useful to voters.  This is 
true because voters’ and shareholders’ informational interests in corporate 
campaign finance disclosure are often in opposition; the two are, 
essentially, competing audiences with conflicting interests in the content 
and manner of corporate electoral spending disclosure.  Part II identifies 
and explores four specific points of tension between the informational 
interests of voters and shareholders in corporate electoral spending 
disclosure. 
Part III explores the implications of these conclusions.  It unpacks the 
politics of the audience by outlining the main demographic differences 
between the typical voter and the typical shareholder.  It concludes that 
even a partial refocusing of disclosure priorities away from the interests of 
voters toward those of shareholders will have political consequences.  First, 
it is likely to privilege the political interests of the very wealthy—including 
not only wealthy Americans, but also wealthy foreigners, who own more 
than 10 percent of U.S. stocks—at the expense of the interests of lower-
income Americans.  Second, because shareholders of public companies 
reside in certain geographic areas in greater concentrations than in others, it 
will lead to geographic effects in state and local elections.  Thus corporate 
political activity will be influenced by shareholders’ civic interests in some 
places but not others.  Finally, this part argues that the Court’s newfound 
reliance on shareholder informational interests to justify campaign finance 
disclosure laws ultimately leaves some types of compelled disclosure—
particularly spending disclosure that provides voters (but not shareholders) 
with source revelation—vulnerable to challenge on First Amendment 
grounds. 
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I.   CITIZENS UNITED REPURPOSES 
CORPORATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 
For most of modern U.S. history, voters were understood as the exclusive 
audience for compelled campaign finance disclosures.  This part briefly 
traces the informational interest as a constitutional basis for compelled 
campaign finance disclosure from Buckley v. Valeo to Citizens United v. 
FEC, focusing on the question of audience.  Before Citizens United, the 
possibility that corporate shareholders might be a separate, constitutionally 
cognizable audience for compelled corporate disclosure did not occur to the 
Court, even though Congress had been debating the problem of the 
dissenting shareholder since the early twentieth century, corporations were 
parties in election law cases before the Court, and the Court routinely was 
called upon to analyze the governmental interests served by laws that 
compelled disclosure by corporations.  Potentially strong shareholder 
informational interests lurked in the shadows of several disclosure-related 
cases leading up to Citizens United, but they were never taken up or 
analyzed.  In fact, the first time the issue of shareholders’ informational 
interests was ever mentioned in a Supreme Court opinion was 1990, in a 
footnote in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce.21  In that footnote, Justice Brennan took for granted 
that corporate shareholders received corporate spending information, and 
merely questioned its usefulness.  Thus, when the Court endorsed the idea 
that shareholders are a constitutionally cognizable audience for compelled 
corporate spending disclosure in Citizens United, it was forging new 
ground. 
A.   Buckley v. Valeo and Its Progeny 
The exacting scrutiny standard—which requires a government to 
successfully argue that a law challenged on First Amendment grounds 
serves a “sufficiently important” governmental interest—was first applied 
by the Supreme Court to compelled campaign finance disclosure in its 
iconic 1976 opinion, Buckley v. Valeo.22  In Buckley, the Court upheld 
portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197123 (FECA), including 
several recordkeeping and reporting provisions, against a First Amendment 
challenge.24 
 
 21. 494 U.S. 652, 674 n.5 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 22. 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30126, 30141–
30145). 
 24. FECA required “political committees” to maintain records of contributors donating 
more than $10, and to file quarterly reports with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
that provided the name, mailing address, occupation, and principal place of business of any 
person who contributed more than $100 in a calendar year. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63–64.  
Individuals or organizations that spent more than $100 in a calendar year were required to 
file a report directly with the FEC. Id.  The parties challenging FECA argued that these 
provisions were unconstitutionally overbroad insofar as they required recordkeeping and 
reporting related to minor party and independent candidates, of contributions of as little as 
$11, and of independent expenditures. Id. at 60–61. 
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In its analysis of FECA’s disclosure provisions, the Buckley Court 
acknowledged that compelled campaign finance disclosure can infringe 
First Amendment rights, but explained that “there are governmental 
interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, 
particularly when the ‘free functioning of our national institutions’ is 
involved.”25  The Court then identified “three categories” of governmental 
interests “of this magnitude” that supported compelled campaign finance 
disclosure.26  The first and, in the Court’s analysis, the most important, was 
the “informational interest.”27  The Court wrote: 
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information “as to where 
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the 
candidate” in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal 
office.  It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum 
more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels 
and campaign speeches.  The sources of a candidate’s financial support 
also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to 
be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in 
office.28 
The Court’s language unambiguously identified “the electorate” and 
“voters” as the constitutionally cognizable audience for compelled 
campaign finance disclosure.29  Buckley did not acknowledge other 
audiences for campaign finance disclosure, including corporate 
stakeholders, the media, scholars, business competitors, or candidates 
themselves, as relevant to First Amendment analysis. 
The critical idea behind Buckley’s analysis of FECA’s disclosure 
provisions was that voters use campaign finance information to make 
voting decisions.  The Court’s analysis was voter-centric, looking at each 
disclosure requirement from the perspective of a voter evaluating 
 
 25. Id. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 
97 (1961)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 81. 
 28. Id. at 66–67 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-564, at 4 (1971)). 
 29. Id.  The second category of governmental interest identified by the Court was an 
anticorruption interest, but it, too, hinged on the disclosure of information to the citizenry, 
and on citizens’ use of that information.  Compelled disclosure “deter[red] actual corruption 
and avoid[ed] the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures 
to the light of publicity.” Id. at 67.  The Court explained that “[a] public armed with 
information about a candidate’s most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-
election special favors that may be given in return.” Id.  Although the Court used the word 
“public” in that sentence, its context makes it clear that the Court meant voters.  The third 
category of governmental interest supporting compelled campaign finance disclosure, 
according to the Court, was an enforcement interest to detect violations of FECA’s 
contribution limits. Id. at 67–68.  In contrast to the first two categories of informational 
interests, which were achieved through the provision of information to voters, this interest 
did not require public disclosure, because data gathering and the detection of violations 
could be done by authorities charged with enforcing campaign finance laws, like the FEC, 
and because those authorities would ultimately enforce FECA. See Richard Briffault, 
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 280 (2010). 
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candidates.30  The Court upheld the direct reporting requirements of FECA, 
which required individuals and organizations that engaged in direct 
independent expenditures to file reports with the FEC, by defining the word 
“expenditure” in the statute narrowly to cover only communications that 
“expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate.”31  With this clarification, the Court held that the law served the 
sufficiently important governmental interest of “increas[ing] the fund of 
information concerning those who support the candidates.”32  The Court 
clarified that the “informational interest can be as strong” with independent 
expenditures as it is with contributions because “disclosure helps voters to 
define more of the candidates’ constituencies.”33  The point was that source 
revelation—the revelation of the identities of a candidate’s financial 
supporters—is a key component of the informational interest. 
Buckley laid the groundwork for all of the Court’s subsequent analysis of 
the informational interests supporting compelled registration, 
recordkeeping, disclaimers, and reporting, and it remains today the most 
detailed elucidation of the informational interest.  After Buckley, the 
Supreme Court decided several First Amendment challenges to state and 
federal laws that compelled election-related disclosures from individuals 
and organizations.  The Court’s disclosure-related opinions—including the 
concurring and dissenting opinions—assumed that voters were the main 
audience for compelled disclosure, and the exclusive audience from a First 
Amendment perspective.34  This assumption made sense, because Buckley 
viewed the main informational purpose of campaign finance disclosure as 
revealing to voters the identities of a candidate’s financial backers.  Implicit 
in Buckley’s analysis of disclosure was the idea that information about a 
 
 30. For example, the Buckley Court observed that since “minor parties usually represent 
definite and publicized viewpoints, there may be less need to inform the voters of the 
interests that specific candidates represent.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70.  But, the Court noted, a 
minor party candidate “may be encouraged by major-party interests in order to divert votes 
from other major-party contenders.” Id.  The Court suggested that a main way that voters 
could learn about this diversion strategy was through the public disclosure of campaign 
finance data. Id. at 71. 
 31. Id. at 80. 
 32. Id. at 81. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196, 200 (2003) (quoting at length from 
the district court’s description of how the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) 
enhanced disclosure required corporations and unions “to reveal their identities so that the 
public is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast advertisements 
influencing certain elections,” and describing a “need to make the contents of parties’ 
disclosure statements available to curious voters in advance of elections” (quoting 
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. State 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 698 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing how 
Michigan’s law “operate[d] to prohibit information essential to the ability of voters to 
evaluate candidates”); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454 
U.S. 290, 298 (1981) (assuming that “voters” were the audience for all disclosures required 
by a Berkeley, California campaign finance ordinance). 
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candidate’s financial backers—the candidate’s “constituenc[y]”—is highly 
valuable to voters in deciding how to vote.35 
In more than thirty years of post-Buckley campaign finance disclosure 
cases, the Court did not consider the possibility that corporate shareholders 
might have separate, constitutionally cognizable informational interests in 
compelled campaign finance registration, recordkeeping, disclaimers, or 
reporting.  This is true even in cases in which corporations were parties.36  
And it was true in cases in which aspects of the disclosure laws in question 
advanced interests unique to corporate shareholders—such as advance 
disclosure requirements, which compel disclosure about future corporate 
expenditures potentially far enough in advance for dissenting shareholders 
to use the procedures of corporate democracy to stop them.37  When 
shareholder informational interests lurked in the background of election law 
cases, the Supreme Court ignored them,38 and its analysis revealed that it 
 
 35. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81. 
 36. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298.  At least one plaintiff in the 
case was a for-profit corporation that had violated the Berkeley ordinance by donating more 
than $250 to an electoral campaign.  The corporation’s shareholders thus had a strong 
interest in learning about the company’s donation, not only because of its expressive 
significance but because it was illegal. See Brief of Appellants at 8, Citizens Against Rent 
Control, 454 U.S. 290 (No. 80-737), 1980 U.S. S. Ct. LEXIS 1783.  The shareholder 
informational interest went unrecognized in the case. 
 37. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (discussing disclosure rules that required corporate spenders to disclose executory 
contracts to pay for election-related advertisements before the payments were made, thus 
“revealing where ads are to be run and what their content is likely to be”); id. at 362 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing disclosure rules that required broadcast licensees to 
disclose requests for broadcast time from purchasers, even in cases in which a request did 
not result in an actual purchase).  In Citizens Against Rent Control, Pacific Gas and Electric 
Corp. (PG&E), filed an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme Court to oppose the Berkeley 
campaign finance law on First Amendment grounds. See Brief of Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company as Amicus Curiae at 33, Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290 (No. 80-
737), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. LEXIS 884.  PG&E’s brief argued that the law violated voters’ right 
to receive information to help them decide how to vote, but PG&E never acknowledged that 
the law would have advanced its own shareholders’ ability to learn about its political 
spending activities. Id.  This was because the law would have prevented PG&E from 
contributing more than $250 to campaign committees, but would have allowed PG&E to 
“communicate directly with the electorate,” so long as it complied with disclosure laws. 
Appellees Brief at 13, Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290 (No. 80-737), 1981 U.S. 
S. Ct. LEXIS 881.  Because Berkeley’s law encouraged direct and fully disclosed 
independent expenditures by corporations like PG&E and the corporate plaintiff in the case, 
it potentially advanced shareholders’ informational interests—but shareholder informational 
interests were not asserted to justify the law. See also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 
479 U.S. 238 (1986) (failing to consider that shareholder informational interests could have 
provided a more streamlined rule of decision, because shareholders in for-profit corporations 
possess unique, economically based interests in corporate PAC disclosures that members of 
nonprofit corporations do not, and which could justify increased administrative burdens for 
for-profit corporations but not for nonprofit corporations). 
 38. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007); Wis. Right to 
Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006) (taken together, increasing the types of 
political ads that could be funded directly from corporate treasuries, with no discussion of 
shareholders’ interests); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) 
(ignoring how Colorado’s campaign finance disclosure law would have compelled the 
disclosure of corporate spending information when corporations sponsored ballot initiatives); 
Austin, 494 U.S. at 664 (focusing on whether, under the Michigan state law in question, for-
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consistently assumed that shareholders already had access to corporate 
spending information.39 
Justice Brennan was the first Supreme Court Justice to raise 
shareholders’ informational interests in corporate electoral spending 
disclosure, in a footnote in a concurring opinion in Austin.40  He noted that 
“shareholders in a large business corporation may find it prohibitively 
expensive to monitor the activities of the corporation to determine whether 
it is making expenditures to which they object.”41  Yet Justice Brennan’s 
choice of words suggests that he believed shareholders had access to 
corporate spending information; he wondered merely if the cost to 
shareholders of monitoring that spending information was worth it. 
The Court’s voter primacy approach to campaign finance disclosure was 
so strong that, in 1998, it held that voters could suffer an actionable 
“informational injury” if the Federal Election Commission failed to 
properly enforce campaign finance disclosure laws.  In FEC v. Akins,42 the 
Court held that a group of voters had standing to challenge the FEC’s 
decision not to bring an enforcement action against a nonprofit corporation 
for its violation of campaign finance disclosure laws, reasoning that the 
voters’ injury “consists of their inability to obtain information” that was 
subject to compelled disclosure under FECA.43  Akins’s recognition of 
voters’ interest in receiving compelled campaign finance disclosure was 
reciprocal to the government’s long-established interest in providing voters 
with this information through compelled campaign finance disclosure. 
Thus, in the lead-up to Citizens United, the Supreme Court had very 
consistently, over more than three decades, treated voters as the exclusive 
audience for compelled electoral disclosure as a matter of First Amendment 
law.  The Court’s voter-centric view of disclosure might have led it to 
conclude that intermediaries, such as the media, constitute an important 
audience for campaign finance disclosure insofar as they synthesize 
disclosure data and communicate it to voters.  Some election law scholars 
have argued as much.44  Other audiences exist for campaign finance 
disclosure, including academics, candidates and elected officials, and, for 
 
profit corporations could circumvent campaign finance laws forbidding corporate 
contributions and expenditures by “funneling money through the Chamber’s general 
treasury,” while ignoring how this would hide corporate political expenditures from the 
corporation’s own shareholders). 
 39. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 687, 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 40. Id. at 674 n.5 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
 41. Id.  In his concurrence, Justice Brennan also assumed that shareholders would be 
fully informed about the corporation’s political expenditures when he wrote, “the provision 
in Michigan corporate law authorizing shareholder actions against corporate waste might 
serve as a remedy for other types of political expenditures that have no legitimate connection 
to the corporation’s business.” Id. at 678. 
 42. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
 43. Id. at 21.  The FEC had argued that the injury to the voters’ informational interest 
was so abstract and widely shared that it could not confer standing, but the Court disagreed, 
observing that “the informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most 
basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific” that the voters could bring their 
claim. Id. at 24–25. 
 44. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 288. 
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corporate spenders, shareholders, creditors, and business competitors.45  
The Court, however, never so much as hinted that the existence of these 
other audiences might give rise to constitutionally cognizable informational 
interests. 
B.   Citizens United v. FEC 
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court invalidated section 441b46 
of FECA, which prohibited corporations from making “electioneering 
communications” in connection with federal elections, but upheld 
disclaimer and disclosure provisions of the same law.47  The legal analysis 
of the Citizens United opinion comprised two parts:  a main, “substantive” 
part about section 441b’s ban on electioneering communications by 
corporations, and a secondary part addressing disclosure.  The Court’s 
majority opinion reflected this division, devoting forty-eight pages to the 
substantive part of the case, which reflected a contentious five-to-four split 
among the Justices, overturned key election law precedent, and held 
section 441b unconstitutional.48  The disclosure part of the case, part IV, 
took up only six pages, reflected the agreement of eight Justices, and upheld 
the challenged disclosure laws.49  Commentators have treated the first, 
substantive part of Citizens United as the important part of the case, and the 
last, disclosure-related part as a sidelight lacking significance.50 
However, part IV of Citizens United should be understood as 
pathbreaking in its own right:  it expanded the constitutionally cognizable 
audience for campaign finance disclosure to include a new group, corporate 
shareholders.  In the first, substantive part of the case, which overturned the 
corporate electioneering ban, the Court’s analysis focused on the value of 
electioneering speech to “the public” and to “voters.”51  However in part 
IV, the Court’s analysis of the interests advanced by the reporting and 
disclosure of corporate spending was meaningfully different.  The Court 
analyzed corporate spending disclosures as justified by bivalent 
informational interests—those of both voters and shareholders.  This was a 
 
 45. See, e.g., Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative 
Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 76 (2010) (discussing legislators as an important 
audience for campaign finance disclosure). 
 46. The relevant statutes have since been transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. (West 
Supp. 2014).  Section 441b is now located at 52 U.S.C. § 30118. 
 47. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 48. Id. at 319–66.  Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas joined in the 
majority opinion as to the substantive speech prohibition. 
 49. Id. at 366–71. 
 50. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC is best known for striking down 
as an unconstitutional restriction of free speech the federal law that bans corporations and 
labor unions from running campaign-related advertisements in the lead-up to an election.  
That holding largely overshadowed another part of the decision upholding the same law’s 
campaign finance disclosure provisions.” (citation omitted)). 
 51. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (“By suppressing the speech of manifold 
corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and 
viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are 
hostile to their interests.”). 
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departure from the Court’s longstanding and well-established view that the 
informational interest justifying campaign finance disclosure as a matter of 
First Amendment law is concerned exclusively with voters’ informational 
needs because of the role of voters in American democracy. 
Citizens United, Inc. had created a ninety-minute film featuring 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, which it released in the lead-up to 
the 2008 presidential primaries.52  The company created two ten-second ads 
and one thirty-second ad to promote the movie and wanted to distribute the 
movie to digital cable subscribers via video-on-demand within thirty days 
of the 2008 Democratic primary election.  But the company was prohibited 
from doing so by the ban on corporate electioneering communications.  The 
company brought suit, challenging both the corporate electioneering ban 
and disclosure laws that applied to electioneering communications.53  
Citizens United, Inc. lost both challenges in federal district court and, after 
the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, 
Citizens United, Inc. appealed.54 
After the first round of briefing and an oral argument before the Supreme 
Court, which largely focused on the corporate electioneering ban, the Court 
restored the case to the calendar for reargument and directed the parties to 
submit new briefs on whether the Court should overrule Austin, the relevant 
part of McConnell v. FEC,55 or both.56  The Court’s move to reframe the 
case caused the disclosure issue to recede further into the background, 
where it was overshadowed by the “substantive” question of whether the 
First Amendment forbids government from prohibiting corporate outside 
spending. 
Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion.  The government had 
argued that several interests were advanced by the corporate electioneering 
ban, including an anti-distortion rationale, an anticorruption interest, and a 
shareholder protection interest.57  The Court explored the first two interests 
at length and ultimately rejected both.  It then turned to the asserted 
governmental interest in shareholder protection.  Giving the subject a mere 
two paragraphs, the Court rejected shareholder protection as a basis for 
prohibiting corporate electioneering communications and other independent 
expenditures.58  Instead of a government “regulatory mechanism . . . based 
on speech,” the Court concluded that corporations must regulate 
themselves, “through the procedures of corporate democracy” imagined in 
 
 52. See Matthew Mosk, Now Playing:  An Anti-Clinton Ad?, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 
2007, 10:15 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2007/12/now-playing-a-clinton-
attack-a.html. 
 53. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–21. 
 54. See Citizens United v. FEC, 555 U.S. 1028 (2008) (noting probable jurisdiction); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 55. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 56. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (restoring case for oral argument). 
 57. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–62. 
 58. The Court did not view the governmental interest in shareholder protection as invalid 
per se, but suggested that it swept too broadly.  It observed that the shareholder protection 
interest would “allow the Government to ban the political speech even of media 
corporations,” which “[t]he First Amendment does not allow.” Id. at 361. 
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First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.59  The “substantive” ban on 
corporate outside spending was overturned. 
Having concluded that corporations may not be prohibited from spending 
on electioneering communications, the Court addressed the disclosure 
requirements that would apply to them, which included both disclaimers in 
the film and its advertisements, and public disclosure of how much money 
Citizens United, Inc. spent to fund the film and its advertisements.  In part 
IV of the majority opinion, an eight-Justice majority upheld the challenged 
disclaimer and disclosure provisions, concluding that they satisfied exacting 
scrutiny.60  The Court affirmed that campaign finance disclosure laws were 
subject to the exacting scrutiny standard, which requires the government to 
identify a “‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest,” and a 
“substantial relation” between the government interest and the compelled 
disclosure.61  The Court then analyzed the disclaimer and disclosure 
provisions separately and in a way that suggested that the target audiences 
for each type of requirement were different. 
1.   The Disclaimers 
The disclaimer requirements of section 311 of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 200262 (BCRA) required that any televised electioneering 
communication include, in a “clearly spoken manner,” certain information, 
including the following statement:  “_______ is responsible for the content 
of this advertising.”63  In approving the constitutionality of the compelled 
disclaimers, the Court rejected the view that movie ad disclaimers could not 
promote the government’s informational interest because they were 
“commercial.”  The Court wrote that the disclaimers “‘provid[e] the 
electorate with information,’ and ‘insure[s] that the voters are fully 
informed’ about the person or group who is speaking.”64  The Court viewed 
the disclaimers as targeting voters who watched the ads and did not discuss 
 
 59. Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  These reasons were “sufficient to reject this shareholder-
protection interest,” the Court wrote, but it went on to argue that the law was both 
underinclusive and overinclusive in protecting shareholders because the spending ban 
applied, at most, sixty days before an election, and because it applied to nonprofit 
corporations. Id. at 362.  The Court explained that “a dissenting shareholder’s interests 
would be implicated by speech in any media at any time.” Id. 
 60. Only Justice Thomas dissented from part IV of the Court’s opinion.  Justice Thomas 
did not address shareholder informational interests in his dissent, and instead based his 
objection on “the ‘right to anonymous speech.’” Id. at 480 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 276 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part)). 
 61. See id. at 366–67 (majority opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 
(1976)). 
 62. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
 63. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366.  In addition, section 311 required a communication 
that the ad “is not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee,” and a display of 
the name and address or website URL of the individual or organization that paid for the ad. 
See id.; see also 52 U.S.C. § 30120 (West Supp. 2014). 
 64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368 (citation omitted) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 
196; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76). 
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the possibility that corporate shareholders also might have viewed the ads 
and found the disclaimers informative about their corporations’ spending.  
Under the majority’s analysis, disclaimers were constitutionally justified 
solely based on the government’s “sufficiently important” interest in 
providing disclaimer information to voters. 
2.   The Spending Disclosures 
The majority’s analysis of compelled spending disclosure was different.  
BCRA section 201 required a person to file a disclosure report with the 
FEC if its spending on electioneering communications exceeded a certain 
threshold; the FEC publishes these spending reports on its public website.65  
The disclosure report—FEC Form 9—required the spender to report 
information about itself, including its name and address, and the identity of 
anyone who exercised control over the spender, as well as details about its 
disbursements (to whom it paid money, and how much) and the sources of 
its funds (who donated money to the spender, and how much).66 
Citizens United, Inc. had argued that section 201 served no informational 
purpose as applied to its ads because the ads were “commercial” 
advertisements, and the Court began its analysis there.67  The Court 
observed that this argument was “similar to the argument rejected above 
with respect to disclaimers,” and dismissed it again, observing that “[e]ven 
if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest 
in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election.”68  
Having rejected Citizens United, Inc.’s contention that no informational 
interest can attach to a “commercial” advertisement, the Court wrote that 
“the informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application of § 201 
to these ads,” and stated that for this reason it would not consider other 
interests asserted by the government.69  The Court then briefly considered 
and rejected Citizens United, Inc.’s argument that the disclosure 
requirements would chill its donations.70 
Finally, the Court reached the crux of the matter:  the informational 
purpose of the compelled spending disclosures.  In a lengthy passage 
containing the most oft-quoted language from part IV, the Court provided a 
 
 65. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f).  The law requires a spender to file a disclosure report if it 
spends more than $10,000 on electioneering communications in a calendar year. See id. 
§ 30104(f)(1). 
 66. See FEC FORM 9, 24 HOUR NOTICE OF DISBURSEMENT/OBLIGATIONS FOR 
ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS, available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm9.pdf. 
 67. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368. 
 68. Id. at 369.  In previous campaign finance disclosure cases, the Court had sometimes 
used the phrase “the public” to mean voters. See, e.g., supra note 34.  Here, in light of the 
Court’s discussion of shareholder interests in disclosure information two paragraphs later, it 
is not clear whether the Court was using the term “the public” to mean the voting public (i.e., 
citizens) or was, instead, using it in a broader sense to mean the whole public (i.e., 
participants in the public capital markets). 
 69. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369. 
 70. Id. at 370. 
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detailed and specific view about who is informed by corporate campaign 
finance disclosure, and for what purpose: 
Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate 
democracy can be more effective today because modern technology 
makes disclosures rapid and informative.  A campaign finance system that 
pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not 
existed before today.  It must be noted, furthermore, that many of 
Congress’ findings in passing BCRA were premised on a system without 
adequate disclosure.  With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of 
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information 
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their 
positions and supporters.  Shareholders can determine whether their 
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in 
making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are “‘in the 
pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”  The First Amendment protects 
political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react 
to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.  This transparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight 
to different speakers and messages.71 
The Court’s analysis made it clear that the informational interest supporting 
compelled campaign finance reporting was no longer just about voters.  The 
Court had introduced corporate shareholders as a new, constitutionally 
cognizable audience for campaign finance disclosure—specifically for 
corporate spending disclosure—and had described shareholders’ interests in 
spending disclosure as nearly as important as the interests of voters. 
In a single sentence that followed this passage, the Court wrote that “[f]or 
the same reasons we uphold the application of [the disclaimer and 
disclosure provisions] to the ads, we affirm their application to” Hillary:  
The Movie.72  Thus, the Court’s reasoning about shareholder interests was 
incorporated into its analysis of compelled disclosure relating both to the 
advertisements and to the film itself. 
Justice Kennedy structured the key passage, quoted above, to present 
shareholders’ and voters’ interests as if they hold nearly equivalent value in 
the First Amendment analysis.  The passage starts with shareholders’ 
interests, ends with voters’ interests, and invokes shareholder interests four 
times—precisely the same number of times that it uses the word “voter” or 
“electorate.”  When the passage describes the informational purposes of 
corporate electoral spending disclosure—the very heart of governmental 
interest analysis under exacting scrutiny—it puts shareholders’ interests 
before voters’ interests twice, observing first that “prompt disclosure of 
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information 
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable,” and then, in 
the next sentence, that “[s]hareholders can determine whether their 
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making 
 
 71. Id. at 370–71 (citations omitted) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 
(2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310). 
 72. Id. at 371. 
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profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are ‘“in the pocket” of 
so-called moneyed interests.’”73  That sentence is important; it reveals not 
only the majority’s view that shareholders’ primary informational interest in 
corporate spending disclosure is financial rather than expressive, but also its 
view that voters’ primary informational interest in corporate electoral 
spending disclosure relates to ferreting out influence, rather than to deciding 
how to vote.74 
The opinion puts voters’ interests ahead of shareholders’ interests only 
once, in the next to last sentence in the paragraph, opining broadly that 
“disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of 
corporate entities in a proper way.”75  The final sentence breaks from the 
bivalent language used above and seems, as an afterthought, to return voter 
interests to the center of the disclosure enterprise. 
The Court’s assertion that campaign finance disclosure serves to help 
shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s political speech 
advances the corporation’s interest in making profits” was the first time the 
Court has ever suggested either that campaign finance disclosure laws serve 
a corporate governance function—here, to monitor management and 
thereby to reduce agency costs—or that campaign finance disclosure laws 
should advance the private financial interests of a subset of Americans.76  
As is explored in more detail in Part II, state and federal corporate laws 
already give shareholders default informational rights, and other private law 
mechanisms exist to enhance transparency and accountability of corporate 
managers to shareholders.  The Court’s move to expand the audience for 
campaign finance disclosure to include shareholders introduced a new, 
private purpose behind public campaign finance disclosure laws. 
The Court’s sole focus on shareholders’ interest in promoting corporate 
profit-making embedded in the Court’s analysis a particular view about 
profit maximization as a purpose of corporate law.  In this way, the Court 
was essentially taking sides in a corporate law debate that rages to this day:  
whether and to what extent the goal of corporate law is to maximize profit 
for shareholders (including subsidiary questions about short-term profit 
maximization versus long-term profit maximization).77 
 
 73. Id. at 370 (emphasis added). 
 74. The majority’s assertion that voters should use corporate spending disclosure to “see 
whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests” is perplexing in 
light of the majority’s conclusion, only pages earlier, that independent expenditures can 
never give rise to corruption.  Id. at 360 (“[I]ndependent expenditures do not lead to, or 
create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption. . . .  Ingratiation and access . . . are not 
corruption.”)  Read together, these two parts of the opinion acknowledge that elected 
officials can be “in the pocket” of corporations and suggest there is something wrong with 
that—why else would voters want to determine if a candidate is in a donor’s pocket?—but 
conclude that voters must use preference satisfaction at the polls, rather than law, to address 
it. 
 75. Id. at 371 (emphasis added). 
 76. See id. at 370. 
 77. See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate 
Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 240, 249 (2010) (critiquing shareholder wealth 
maximization for promoting Pareto optimality as a normative value in corporate law). 
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Strikingly, the government had never argued, in its briefs or at oral 
argument, that shareholder informational interests were relevant to FECA’s 
disclosure laws.  The government’s briefs discussed shareholder interests 
only in the context of the corporate electioneering ban, and the Court 
rejected all of the government’s asserted interests in shareholder protection 
in the first part of Citizens United. 
It is possible that the Court’s endorsement of shareholder informational 
interests in campaign finance disclosure was drawn from, or at least 
influenced by, arguments made in the first of two amici curiae briefs filed 
jointly by the Center for Political Accountability (CPA) and the Carol and 
Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research (“Zicklin Center”) at 
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.78  This brief argued 
that campaign finance disclosure serves the informational interests of 
corporations themselves, as well the informational interests of corporate 
shareholders and directors, emphasizing the value of campaign finance 
disclosure for the corporation’s compliance program.79  Much of the brief’s 
discussion concerned the value of disclosures by outside spending 
organizations that accepted corporate donations and not disclosures made 
by corporations themselves.  The value of such disclosures to corporations 
is quite different from the shareholder interests endorsed by the Citizens 
United majority; the idea conveyed by the CPA-Zicklin Center brief is that 
spending disclosures by outside spending groups can inform a corporate 
donor about how the group has spent the corporation’s donation, and thus 
allow the corporation to monitor the groups to which it donates money.  If 
the Court did borrow ideas about shareholder informational interests in 
campaign finance disclosure from the CPA-Zicklin Center amicus brief, it 
did not cite the brief in its opinion, and it offered no other attribution.80 
 
 78. In the first phase of Citizens United, the CPA and the Zicklin Center filed a joint 
amicus brief focusing on the disclosure issue. See Brief of the Center for Political 
Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research As 
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 
476569 [hereinafter CPA-Zicklin Center, Original Brief].  After the Supreme Court asked 
the parties to re-brief the case focusing on whether to overrule Austin and McConnell, the 
CPA and the Zicklin Center filed a joint supplemental amicus brief that focused on the 
corporate electioneering ban. See Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the 
Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the Wharton School As 
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee on Supplemental Question, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2349016 [hereinafter CPA-Zicklin Center, Supplemental Brief].  
Both CPA-Zicklin Center briefs supported the corporate electioneering ban and the 
challenged disclaimer and disclosure laws and urged the Court to uphold them. 
 79. Disclosure serves corporations’ informational interests, the CPA-Zicklin Center brief 
asserted, because it “strengthens a corporation’s ability to monitor the use of its funds and 
supervise employees and agents for compliance with its internal policies,” “remind[s] 
corporations of their legal obligations when they engage with the public on political issues,” 
and “enable[s] them to develop and sustain the compliance programs necessary to safely 
navigate the terrain of campaign finance law.” CPA-Zicklin Center, Original Brief, supra 
note 78, at 5–6. 
 80. If the majority opinion did derive its shareholder interest theory from the CPA-
Zicklin Center brief, it misunderstood that brief.  The CPA-Zicklin Center brief argued that 
corporations, shareholders, and directors all have informational interests in campaign finance 
disclosure, and asserted it that “[m]andatory disclosure enables shareholders to monitor the 
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The significance of the Court’s reconceived audience for corporate 
spending disclosure went unrecognized in several long dissents.  Justice 
Stevens critiqued the majority’s rejection of the shareholder protection 
rationale in connection with the corporate electioneering ban, which he said 
was done “on the ground that abuses of shareholder money can be corrected 
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy’ and, it seems, through 
Internet-based disclosures.”81  “Modern technology may help make it easier 
to track corporate activity, including electoral advocacy,” he wrote, “but it 
is utopian to believe that it solves the problem” that dissenting shareholders 
lack meaningful tools to influence corporate political spending.82  In other 
words, Justice Stevens’s critique suggested that shareholders’ interest in 
learning about corporate spending is low because shareholders can do little 
with that information.  He explained: 
Most American households that own stock do so through intermediaries 
such as mutual funds and pension plans, which makes it more difficult 
both to monitor and to alter particular holdings. . . .  Moreover, if the 
corporation in question operates a PAC, an investor who sees the 
company’s ads may not know whether they are being funded through the 
PAC or through the general treasury. 
If and when shareholders learn that a corporation has been spending 
general treasury money on objectionable electioneering, they can divest.  
Even assuming that they reliably learn as much, however, this solution is 
only partial.  The injury to the shareholders’ expressive rights has already 
occurred . . . .83 
By pointing out that shareholders lack tools to prevent corporate spending 
“[i]f” or “[e]ven assuming” they learn about it, Justice Stevens was getting 
 
use of corporate funds for political activity and to exercise their right to object to uses of 
which they disapprove.” Id. at 21.  This suggests that expressive interests (rather than 
financial interests) lay at the heart of shareholder interest in corporate political spending 
data.  Later, in language that Justice Kennedy seemed to echo in part IV, the CPA-Zicklin 
Center brief explained that: 
Disclosure provides shareholders with the information necessary to make informed 
decisions, without restricting the corporation from engaging in political activity.  
Shareholders can choose to use this information as they see fit—for example, they 
may divest, or they may seek change from within.  Without disclosure 
requirements, however, shareholders lack the means to make that choice. 
Id. at 22 (citation omitted).  Justice Kennedy’s assertion that shareholders’ interest in 
disclosure boils down to its use to “determine whether their corporation’s political speech 
advances the corporation’s interest in making profits” did not come from the CPA-Zicklin 
Center brief, however. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.  The CPA-Zicklin Center brief did 
not characterize profit maximization as the main purpose of the corporation, and the CPA-
Zicklin Center’s supplemental brief expressed caution about “the drive to maximize 
shareholder profit,” arguing that it “leads corporations to seek to prevent or reduce 
competition, to privatize public goods, and to minimize taxation.” CPA-Zicklin Center, 
Supplemental Brief, supra note 78, at 8.  There was, however, discussion of profit-making as 
the main corporate objective during oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53–
54, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 6325467. 
 81. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting 
id. at 370 (majority opinion)). 
 82. Id. at 477 (citation omitted). 
 83. Id. 
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at the heart of the informational problem:  shareholders might not learn 
about objectionable spending.  But Justice Stevens did not carry that insight 
any further, or consider the implications of the Court’s view that campaign 
finance disclosure should have, as a signal purpose, the provision of 
corporate expenditure information to shareholders. 
The majority in Citizens United missed something important:  the 
government’s interest in providing corporate spending information to 
shareholders is an interest in shareholder protection, and the Court has 
historically resisted shareholder protection as a basis for justifying the 
regulation of elections under the First Amendment.  If the Court had 
recognized its disclosure analysis as endorsing shareholder protection, it 
might not have been so quick to repurpose campaign finance disclosure for 
a shareholder audience. 
Shareholders in a corporation are essentially sidelined from management 
and perform a monitoring role.  A shareholder’s ability to effectively 
monitor corporate management, and thus to reduce agency costs, depends 
on the shareholder’s access to corporate information.  A shareholder may 
object to corporate political spending because it is wasteful or inefficient, or 
on ideological grounds, or for some other reason; but to object to corporate 
political spending the shareholder must first know about it.  This requires 
shareholders to have access to information about the corporation’s 
expenditures.  Thus, on a fundamental level, questions about shareholder 
access to corporate spending information are about the protection of 
shareholders, typically minority shareholders, from oppressive conduct by 
other shareholders, or from disloyal conduct by managers. 
Two years after Buckley, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,84 
the Court addressed for the first time the argument that a state’s interest in 
shareholder protection could justify a law restricting speech protected by 
the First Amendment.  Although the case did not address compelled 
disclosure—it concerned an outright ban on corporate spending—it 
considered the interests of corporate shareholders in connection with the 
corporation’s political spending.  The Bellotti Court discussed at length the 
problem of the “dissenting shareholder”—the idea that one or more 
minority shareholders might oppose the corporation’s political spending on 
ideological grounds—but took for granted that all shareholders would be 
well-informed about the corporation’s political spending.  Bellotti rejected 
the shareholder protection rationale advanced by the State of Massachusetts, 
famously opining that, “[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, through the 
procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should 
engage in debate on public issues.”85 
 
 84. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 85. Id. at 794.  The Court found the law both underinclusive and overinclusive in the 
way it purported to protect shareholders, id. at 787, which suggested, the Court wrote, that 
Massachusetts’s legislature “may have been concerned with silencing corporations on a 
particular subject.” Id. at 793.  There was other evidence that Massachusetts’s legislature had 
passed the law to help assure the passage of a specific income tax referendum. 
2676 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
After Bellotti, the Supreme Court weakly embraced governmental 
interests in shareholder protection in only two other election law disputes,86 
and it had rejected a shareholder protection rationale in the first part of 
Citizens United itself.87  In fact, at oral argument Chief Justice Roberts 
three times described the government’s shareholder protection rationale as 
one that “we have never accepted.”88  Moreover, the Court’s rejection of a 
shareholder protection rationale to justify the corporate electioneering ban 
in the first part of Citizens United undercut its earlier endorsement of the 
rationale to justify FECA’s corporate contribution ban, because there is 
little basis for protecting dissenting shareholders from corporate 
contributions but not from corporate outside spending.89  Thus, the Court’s 
endorsement of what amounts to a shareholder protection interest in the 
disclosure of electoral spending information in part IV of Citizens United 
appears out of step with the Court’s evolving view on shareholder 
protection in election law.90  Because shareholder informational rights are 
well understood to fall within the scope of state corporate law—at least for 
companies that are not subject to federal securities law—the Court’s 
endorsement of a disclosure justification turning on the provision of 
information to shareholders in Citizens United embedded a potential 
federalism problem in its approach.91 
There was an additional twist to the Court’s disclosure analysis in 
Citizens United.  Although the Court discussed shareholder informational 
interests as a primary justification for corporate campaign finance 
disclosure, Citizens United, Inc. itself was a nonprofit corporation and had 
 
 86. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260–61 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court had “acknowledged the 
legitimacy” of the shareholder protection rationale “as to the dissenting stockholder and 
union member” in two earlier cases about union spending, but finding it inapplicable to the 
plaintiff in the case); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982) 
(endorsing a shareholder protection interest with no discussion); see also Austin v. Mich. 
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (ignoring the government’s 
asserted shareholder-protection interest in its analysis, and subtly disaffirming it by focusing 
on whether corporate political spending has “little or no correlation to the public’s support 
for the corporation’s political ideas” rather than on whether the use of the corporation’s 
treasury funds lacks shareholder support). 
 87. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 88. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 80, at 61–64. 
 89. But see Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban 
43 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Working Paper No. 
14-405, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475908. 
 90. At least one U.S. court of appeals has suggested that, following Citizens United, the 
characterization of an interest as a “corporate governance” or “shareholder protection” 
interest rather than a “shareholder informational” interest might be outcome-determinative in 
an election law dispute. See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 600 
(8th Cir. 2013). 
 91. The Court’s eagerness to embrace shareholder protection in the disclosure context 
contrasted with the deference it had shown to federalism principles in other First 
Amendment cases involving election laws. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 
794–96 (1983) (subordinating a state’s interest in regulating presidential elections to the 
“uniquely important national interest” involved). 
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no shareholders.92  Moreover, because it earned no profits, the Court’s view 
that the challenged disclosure laws were justified in part based on the 
government’s interest in helping shareholders “determine whether their 
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making 
profits” was irrelevant to Citizens United, Inc.93  It had no “interest in 
making profits” to be safeguarded or monitored by any party through the 
use of public campaign finance disclosure.  The Court’s endorsement of a 
governmental interest that would apply to some corporations subject to the 
law—but not to Citizens United, Inc. specifically—signaled approval of 
that interest although it probably could not, on its own, have justified the 
law’s application to Citizens United, Inc.94 
But the Court’s discussion of shareholder informational interests in part 
IV was not surplusage; it was necessary to make the first part of the case—
which overturned the corporate electioneering communication ban—
workable.95  The first, substantive part of Citizens United had stripped 
regulatory authority over corporate outside spending from government, 
holding that only shareholders can regulate this form of corporate speech.  
However, because shareholders often lack basic information about the 
corporation’s electoral spending, and cannot easily obtain it if they set out 
to get it, the logic behind Citizens United’s theory of corporate political 
speech was flawed.  The key disclosure passage in part IV, and its 
endorsement of shareholder informational interests in campaign finance 
disclosure, reflected a patch job on a shaky analytical foundation. 
Legal scholarship about Citizens United has neglected part IV, and the 
significance of its discovery of shareholder informational interests in 
campaign finance disclosure has gone unnoticed.  The common insight of 
legal scholars writing about the Court’s disclosure analysis in Citizens 
United is that, by relying only on the informational interest to justify the 
disclosure laws at issue in the case, Citizens United has greatly weakened 
the other two interests that Buckley identified in support of disclosure—the 
anticorruption interest and the enforcement interest—particularly with 
regard to outside spending.96 
 
 92. See Supplemental Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2564711. 
 93. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370. 
 94. See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982) (endorsing a 
shareholder-protection rationale to justify the application of a campaign finance law to a 
nonprofit corporation with no shareholders). See generally Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2844 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 95. See Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights:  Citizens United and Delaware Corporate 
Governance Law, 28 J. LAW & POLITICS 51, 77 (2013) (“The Court upheld the disclosure 
requirements in BCRA § 203 because it believed those disclosure provisions were necessary 
for corporate democracy to be effective.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law, 32 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 217, 227 (2014) (“Citizens United appears to further narrow the permissible 
justifications for . . . disclosure requirements.”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About 
Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 258–59 (2010) (focusing on the informational interest 
because, among other reasons, “the Court in Citizens United chose to rely solely on” it); 
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 665–66, 673 (2012) (arguing 
that Citizens United “undermined two of Buckley’s three disclosure interests”). 
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But if legal scholars have failed to notice that something important 
happened in part IV, lawmakers and lower courts have not.  In 2012, the 
Rhode Island General Assembly amended the state’s campaign finance 
disclosure laws with a declaration that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure” laws 
can “further the rights of . . . shareholders.”97  A proposed federal law, titled 
the Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections 
(“DISCLOSE”) Act has, over several versions, attempted to address 
shareholders’ informational interests, which have been repeatedly cited in 
testimony in Senate hearings about the proposed law.98  In litigation, 
shareholder interests are asserted by government lawyers to justify state 
campaign finance disclosure laws, and courts are following the lead of 
Citizens United by endorsing those shareholder informational interests.99 
And while shareholders’ informational interests in campaign finance 
disclosure were expanded in Citizens United, post–Citizens United cases 
have continued to undercut voters’ informational interests in some types of 
spending disclosure.  The Court’s repurposing of corporate spending 
disclosure must be understood in this light.  In Doe v. Reed,100 decided 
several months after Citizens United, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Washington Public Records Act, which authorized public disclosure of 
referendum petitions, against a First Amendment challenge.  The State of 
Washington had argued that two governmental interests justified the law:  
 
 97. Act of June 26, 2012, ch. 12-446, 2012 R.I. Pub. Laws, available at 
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/PublicLaws/law12/law12446.htm. 
 98. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-492, at 28 (2010) (“Requiring real-time, ongoing 
disclosure of election expenditures, allows shareholders and the public to monitor the use of 
corporations’ capital in the election context, and take whatever actions they want to 
discipline such corporations if they are found to misuse their funds.”); The DISCLOSE Act 
(S. 2516) and the Need for Expanded Public Disclosure of Funds Raised and Spent to 
Influence Federal Elections:  Hearing on S. 2516 Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 
103rd Cong. (2014) (statement of Heather K. Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, 
Yale Law School), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/ 
?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3383996b-7434-4fb7-a89a-f817400151b2; Dollars and Sense:  
How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign Finance Will Affect 2014 and 
Beyond:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 103rd Cong. (2014) (statement 
of Trevor Potter, President & General Counsel of the Campaign Legal Center), available at 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0b21407e-fffc-4834-a823-
d09b56fae344. 
 99. See, e.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 876 
(8th Cir. 2012) (describing “disclosure-related interests” as, inter alia, “providing the 
electorate and shareholders information concerning the source of corporate political 
speech”); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 57 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[I]n the case 
of corporate or organizational speakers, disclosure allows shareholders and members to ‘hold 
[them] accountable for their positions.’” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 
(2010)); W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 14–15 (Mont. 2011) (holding that the 
challenged disclosure law “when read in the context of Montana’s overall campaign finance 
scheme, expresses the legislature’s intent to provide citizens and shareholders with 
information about sources of funds used in support of candidates and ballot issues”), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. W. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012); see also 
Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 595 (8th Cir. 2013); Ctr. for 
Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 470, 490 (7th Cir. 2012); Yamada v. Weaver, 
872 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (D. Haw. 2012); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Smithson, 
750 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1025–26 (S.D. Iowa 2010). 
 100. 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
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(1) an interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, and (2) an 
informational interest.101  The Court concluded that Washington’s interest 
in preserving the integrity of the electoral process was sufficient to satisfy 
exacting scrutiny, and it did not analyze Washington’s informational 
interest.102  Although the majority opinion never discussed Washington’s 
asserted informational interest, both Justices Alito and Thomas, writing 
separately, criticized voters’ informational interests in the disclosures at 
issue in the case, suggesting that they do not support voters’ informational 
interest in source revelation.103  In Justice Thomas’s view, for example, 
“People are intelligent enough to evaluate the merits of a referendum 
without knowing who supported it.”104  Logically, of course, this argument 
would apply broadly to voters’ interest in source revelation in other 
disclosure areas, including disclosure of independent expenditures and 
contributions.  Because shareholders’ informational interests do not turn on 
the value of source revelation, they lack this vulnerability. 
More recently, the same five-member bloc of Justices from Citizens 
United agreed that voters’ informational interests in the disclosure of 
contributions are weak in relation to other interests.  In McCutcheon v. 
FEC,105 a slim five-to-four majority of the Court invalidated federal 
aggregate contribution limits.106  Although McCutcheon did not involve a 
challenge to any disclosure laws, the majority opinion discussed the 
interests justifying compelled disclosure of contributions.107  Because 
federal law prohibits corporations from making contributions, this sort of 
disclosure involves no potential shareholder interests, and the Court did not 
discuss shareholder interests.  But the McCutcheon majority made clear that 
the main governmental interest served by disclosure of contributions is an 
anticorruption interest, not a more general informational interest in 
providing spending information to voters.108 
Thus, in just a few years, the Roberts Court has not only repurposed 
corporate campaign finance disclosure to serve shareholders’ informational 
interests, but has also signaled weakened support for the informational 
interests of voters that turn on source revelation.  Five of the nine Justices 
agree that voters’ informational interest in disclosure of contributions is 
secondary to their anticorruption interest, and two-fifths of the Court’s 
conservative majority has rejected voters’ informational interests in 
 
 101. Id. at 197. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 206–08 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 239–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 239. 
 105. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 106. Id. at 1442. 
 107. Id. at 1459–60. 
 108. The Court observed broadly that “disclosure requirements are in part ‘justified based 
on a governmental interest in provid[ing] the electorate with information about the sources 
of election-related spending.’” Id. at 1459 (emphasis added) (quoting Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010)).  But the Court emphasized a different rationale when it 
discussed contribution disclosure specifically, writing that contribution disclosure 
“minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system” and deters corruption 
“by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.” Id. 
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referendum spending disclosure.  If the Court’s five-Justice majority 
continues to undercut voters’ informational interests in campaign finance 
disclosure, voters’ interest in learning the identities of candidates’ corporate 
backers may take a back seat, as a matter of First Amendment doctrine, to 
shareholders’ interest in learning about corporate political spending so as to 
maximize corporate profits. 
II.   THE COMPETING INFORMATIONAL INTERESTS 
OF VOTERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
Voters’ informational interests in corporate campaign finance disclosure 
arise out of the essential role of the voter in a democracy.  As Buckley put it, 
“Democracy depends upon a well-informed electorate.”109  Citizens can use 
disclosure to “give proper weight to different speakers and messages” in the 
marketplace of ideas, to “make informed decisions” at the polls, and to 
“hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and 
supporters” in various ways.110  Campaign finance disclosure is used by 
voters to evaluate political arguments in the process of democratic 
deliberation.  It is also used for heuristic cues that, research suggests, are 
effective shortcuts for helping voters decide how to vote.111  More broadly, 
campaign finance disclosure helps voters understand the forces that shape 
the institutions of our democracy. 
The informational interests of corporate shareholders are different; they 
primarily relate to a shareholder’s financial interest in a particular 
investment.  Shareholders care about corporate political spending because it 
affects the value of their stock and involves the expenditure of money to 
which shareholders have claim.  Shareholders can use corporate spending 
information to monitor management and reduce agency costs, and to 
evaluate how effectively the company’s election-related expenditures 
advance the company’s political interests, which serve the goal of 
increasing shareholder value.  Shareholders may assert expressive interests 
in the corporation’s political spending, but these are measurable in terms of 
the shareholders’ financial interests in the company.112  In sum, 
 
 109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976); see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 
312, 349 (1991); Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 188 (1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) (“The electoral process, if reality is to conform to 
the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate . . . .”). 
 110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–71; see also Mayer, supra note 96, at 260 (“[I]t is 
desirable for voters to be well-informed about their electoral choices . . . such that voters can 
accurately determine and apply their personal preferences when making such choices.”). 
 111. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy:  Restoring Voter 
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1157–
59 (2003) (discussing interest group support as a heuristic cue). 
 112. A shareholder who owns half of a politically active corporation may object to all of 
that company’s election-related spending but, under basic corporate law principles, only half 
of that spending could be attributed in any sense to her financial interest in the company. 
See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False 
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 477 (2008) (adopting this 
assumption as to corporate costs).  Even that attribution is a bit misleading; shareholders are 
residual claimants of corporate assets, not the “owners” of money spent by the corporation or 
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shareholders’ informational interests in corporate spending disclosure are 
financial in nature, even when they are influenced by civic-mindedness or 
political ideology. 
More fundamentally, voters want to limit the influence of business 
donors on candidates and elected officials, and shareholders would like to 
encourage that influence.  In fact, from the shareholder perspective, it 
would be optimal for a particular corporation, or even a particular industry, 
to achieve complete legislative capture.  This is because elected officials 
can use government to create market inefficiencies that are bad for the 
community as a whole, but that enrich the shareholders of specific 
corporations.  Thus, voters benefit from campaign finance disclosure 
insofar as it reveals the influence of business donors on candidates and 
elected officials, assuming voters can take action to limit that influence, 
while a company’s shareholders can, in some circumstances, benefit when a 
campaign finance disclosure regime functions to hide or obscure that 
company’s political influence. 
Because the nature of voters’ and shareholders’ interests in corporate 
electoral spending information differ in these ways, their interests in 
disclosure diverge as well.  This part examines four key areas of 
divergence, relating to both the content and manner of disclosure, as 
examples of the competing informational interests at stake.  These are only 
examples; I have not attempted to produce a complete catalog of the 
competing interests of voters and shareholders in campaign finance 
disclosure.  These four examples, however, clarify what may be gained and 
what may be lost in campaign finance disclosure by expanding its audience 
to include shareholders, and thereby enlarging its purpose to include 
assisting shareholders in monitoring profit-making. 
A.   The “Materiality” of the Electoral Expenditure 
Voters and shareholders are likely to ascribe importance to corporate 
electoral spending at very different dollar thresholds.  A voter cares about 
corporate expenditure information when it matters to the voting decision, 
and thus is likely to value disclosure of relatively small amounts of 
spending.  A shareholder’s interest in corporate expenditure information is 
greatest when the expenditure is “material” to the shareholder’s 
investment—that is, when the expenditure affects the value of the 
shareholder’s stockholding on a company-by-company basis.  This means 
that the informational interests of voters and shareholders are of completely 
different orders of magnitude.  The desirable disclosure threshold for voters 
will usually turn on the total amount of money spent on a specific electoral 
contest, while the desirable disclosure threshold for shareholders will 
 
of corporate property. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate “Ownership”:  A Misleading Word 
Muddies the Corporate Governance Debate, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 1995, at 16–17; 
Hayden & Bodie, supra, at 473; Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder 
Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804 (2007). 
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usually turn on the amount spent by one corporation in proportion to that 
corporation’s overall financial condition. 
1.   Voter Materiality 
Voters’ interests in corporate political spending information are 
determined by the “materiality” of the information to the voting decision 
and to post-election monitoring of the performance of elected officials.  
Fundamentally, voters’ interests favor public disclosure of most electoral 
spending, including relatively small expenditures.113  This is because even 
small expenditures can serve a useful information-signaling purpose,114 and 
because voters may place a high value on the aggregation of spending data, 
which is more accurate when it accounts for low-dollar spending.  Small 
corporate expenditures are particularly likely to interest voters in state and 
local elections, where total electoral spending tends to be low, and in states 
that allow corporations to donate directly to candidates.115 
By providing source revelation, spending disclosure helps voters evaluate 
candidates and campaign messages.116  Source revelation permits voters to 
“place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely” than might 
otherwise be possible;117 Michael Kang has written that spending 
information constitutes uniquely “trustworthy” information that cuts 
through the “cheap talk of campaign rhetoric,” in which candidates 
sometimes benefit from cultivating ambiguity about their positions.118  
Spending disclosure also can serve a simple “informational signaling” 
function in which it provides voters with heuristic cues that help them 
identify the interests likely to be served by a candidate or ballot 
initiative.119  A voter who knows the political inclinations of a neighbor or a 
 
 113. See Archon Fung, Infotopia:  Unleashing the Democratic Power of Transparency, 
41 POL. & SOC’Y 183, 194 (2013) (arguing that “citizens must be able to know the identity of 
social actors who seek to influence governance processes . . . and the character of their 
political activities,” and advocating for “even fuller public disclosure” of political spending 
by corporations and other organizations than already exists). 
 114. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out:  A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 570 (2012) (“[K]nowing a 
candidate is backed by environmental groups or the gun rights lobby may be all you need to 
know to cast a ballot consistent with your interests.”). 
 115. As of 2012, twenty-eight states permitted direct contributions to candidates from for-
profit companies. Michael M. Franz, Past As Prologue:  The Electoral Influence of 
Corporations, in INTEREST GROUPS UNLEASHED 101, 121 (Paul S. Herrnson, Christopher J. 
Deering & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2013). 
 116. See Gilbert, supra note 12, at 1862; Anthony Johnstone, The System of Campaign 
Finance Disclosure, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 143, 145 (2014). 
 117. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976). 
 118. See, e.g., Michael Kang, Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1700, 1703 (2013). 
 119. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 29, at 297; Kang, supra note 118, at 1714; Mayer, 
supra note 96, at 262–63.  Some legal scholars question the value of heuristic cues, and 
disapproval of their use underlies some judicial skepticism about the value of campaign 
finance disclosure for voters. See Kang, supra note 118, at 1718 (describing and discussing 
commentators’ critiques). 
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business can use spending disclosure to determine which candidate or ballot 
initiative is supported by the neighbor or business, and vote accordingly. 
The aggregation of multiple, low-dollar expenditures may be particularly 
useful to voters.  As the Eleventh Circuit recently observed, “disclosure of a 
plethora of small contributions” is useful to “inform voters about the 
breadth of support for a group or a cause.”120  Voters may find it difficult—
and largely beside the point—to track a particular company’s spending 
activity from year to year, because a company that existed last year may 
exist this year in another form, or under another name.  In many cases, more 
can be learned by tracking aggregate spending by industry or by other 
categories.  Industry-wide spending is particularly revealing because 
companies in the same industry are likely to have similar political 
interests.121  For these reasons, voters’ interests in corporate spending data 
do not turn exclusively on the amount of a particular corporation’s 
expenditures.  Rather, voters have strong informational interests in 
aggregate data, and aggregate data is more accurate, and thus of greater use 
to voters, when it includes all expenditures, including low-dollar spending. 
Corporate spending information also may interest voters insofar as it 
sheds light on the spending of individuals, such as a corporation’s managers 
or employees.  For example, it may interest voters to learn that a company’s 
election-related spending is the same as or different from the election-
related spending of its CEO.122  Such information may be particularly 
revealing in a federal election, in which corporations are prohibited from 
making direct candidate contributions, but CEOs are not.123  It might also 
interest voters to learn that a corporation has given financial support to a 
cause its employees oppose.  If voters are interested in comparing a 
corporation’s electoral expenditures with the donations of its CEO or 
employees, the size of the corporate expenditure matters little; an 
expenditure of any size is a signal about the corporation’s political interest. 
Voters’ interests are also particularly strong in states that allow 
corporations to donate directly to candidates—i.e., “contributions”—which 
are prohibited in federal elections.  The Roberts Court has endorsed a very 
narrow view of corruption, holding that only contributions, and not 
independent expenditures, can give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption as a matter of First Amendment law.124  This suggests that 
voters’ interests in contribution disclosures are different, and potentially 
more significant, than their interests in outside spending disclosures.  It 
follows that voters’ interests in public disclosure of corporate spending data 
is greater in places where corporations may lawfully donate directly to 
candidates. 
 
 120. Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 121. See Noveck, supra note 45, at 107–12. 
 122. In 2009, in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009), the 
Supreme Court recognized that the political interests of a company and the election spending 
of its CEO can be so strongly correlated as to be potentially corrupting. 
 123. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (West Supp. 2014). 
 124. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
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Voters’ interests in learning about small corporate expenditures are 
particularly strong in state and local elections, where a few thousand dollars 
can buy significant influence.  We know that even large corporations 
routinely make small donations to influence state elections.  One need look 
only to the online database of the National Institute on Money in State 
Politics125 to find aggregated electoral spending data from all fifty states, 
and details of thousands of small corporate expenditures in state elections, 
including donations to candidates as low as $50 from multibillion-dollar, 
publicly held companies.126 
For example, in 2012, Chevron, Inc. was one of the top donors to a 
winning candidate for a seat in the New Mexico House of Representatives, 
Don L. Tripp, Jr.  Chevron gave Mr. Tripp $500 that year.127  Mr. Tripp 
received only five other contributions of the same size in that election cycle, 
and only one larger contribution.  Chevron’s electoral spending in the New 
Mexico election that year exemplifies how small amounts of corporate 
spending at the state and local level—as little as $500—can represent a 
significant proportion of the candidate’s overall financial support, and thus 
is likely to interest voters. 
Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal courts have consistently 
endorsed campaign finance disclosure of small amounts of spending, 
revealing a broad and longstanding consensus that spending of small 
amounts is material to voters.  At the state level, the most common 
contribution threshold is $100,128 and thresholds in some states are quite 
low; in Colorado, for example, campaign finance laws compel disclosure of 
all individual contributions of $20 or more.129  Disclosure thresholds for 
outside spending—the type of electoral spending that Citizens United 
addressed, and the only type of electoral spending that corporations can 
 
 125. See NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).  The database of the National Institute on Money in State 
Politics aggregates electoral spending data from all fifty states, making it possible to track a 
particular corporation’s spending across multiple states. 
 126. See Chevron Corp. Contributions to Tim Sbranti, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE 
POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?f-core=1&c-t-eid=23421183&d-
eid=566#[{1|gro=d-id (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (listing $50 donation from Chevron Corp. 
on June 24, 2013 to support Tim Sbranti, a candidate for the Assembly of Concord, 
California).  Interestingly, at the original oral argument in Citizens United, Citizens United’s 
own lawyer seemed to concede that the film at the center of the case was funded, in part, by 
many small corporate donations, and that this fact was obscured by the record in the case. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 
760811 (Theodore B. Olson stating that “it’s possible that corporations throughout America 
were giving small amounts of money to [the film].  [The] record doesn’t establish one way 
or the other”). 
 127. See Chevron Corp. Contributions to Don L. Tripp, Jr., NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN 
STATE POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?f-core=1&c-t-eid=13004424&d-
eid=566#[{1|gro=d-id (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).  According to the National Institute on 
Money in State Politics, Chevron has given Representative Tripp a total of $1500 over three 
elections and is currently ranked seventeenth on the list of his top contributors. Id. 
 128. Johnstone, supra note 96, at 226. 
 129. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) (West 2013); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 16-915(A)(3)(a) (Supp. 2013) ($50 threshold). 
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engage in to influence a federal election—are higher, but still low.130  
Although the tide among legal academics has recently turned against 
disclosure of low-dollar spending,131 the practice of Congress and state 
legislatures over many decades has been to provide fairly granular 
campaign finance information to voters. 
2.   Shareholder Materiality 
In a corporation, the shareholder plays what has been described as a 
“subordinate” governance role that primarily involves monitoring 
management—the board of directors and the officers—and then “voting, 
selling, [or] suing” to prevent managers from neglecting their duties or 
expropriating corporate resources for their own personal benefit.132  
Shareholders need information about corporate operations to fulfill this 
monitoring role; if they fail in their efforts to monitor, the return on their 
investments will be reduced.133 
The federal securities laws require reporting companies to disclose all 
material information to investors, including material information about the 
company’s finances and operations.  Under SEC rules, information is 
material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
attach importance [to the information] in determining whether to purchase” 
the company’s stock.134  Although the SEC and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board have disclaimed a particular quantitative threshold in 
determining what is material,135 amounts in the range of 5 percent of net 
income or total assets are generally understood to be in the materiality 
 
 130. For example, under Colorado law, anyone who donates $1000 or more to an 
independent expenditure committee (a super PAC) must file an independent expenditure 
donor report directly with the state. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-107.5(9). 
 131. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 118, at 1720 (summarizing views of “prominent 
commentators” and agreeing with them that “there is little or no voter information to be 
gained from disclosure from average, low-level contributors”); Noveck, supra note 45, at 
103 (“[R]equiring an overload of information may obscure certain connections and cause 
important information to go overlooked.”). 
 132. Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 
S. CAL. REV. 1359, 1366 (2014). 
 133. See id. 
 134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2013); see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 
449 (1976) (stating that information is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that 
the . . . fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 
99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (stating that information is material “if 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important”); FIN. 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 8:  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING 17 (2010) [hereinafter FASB 8], 
available at http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid= 
1176157498129&acceptedDisclaimer=true (“Information is material if omitting it or 
misstating it could influence decisions that users make on the basis of the financial 
information of a specific reporting entity.”). 
 135. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,151; FASB 8, supra 
note 134 (“[T]he Board cannot specify a uniform quantitative threshold for materiality or 
predetermine what could be material in a particular situation.”). 
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ballpark.136  The larger an expenditure is, the more likely it is to be material 
to investors.  Thus, very small amounts of spending that lack any other 
indicia of qualitative materiality137 are likely not material to shareholders. 
This conclusion is strongly corroborated by the disclosure practices of 
public companies, which generally do not report their electoral expenditures 
in their filings with the SEC.  Some public companies voluntarily disclose 
their political expenditures on their websites,138 and in virtually all cases the 
voluntary disclosures reveal expenditures that fall well below 5 percent of 
net income or total assets.139  The widespread practice of not reporting 
electoral spending in SEC filings, and the low levels of companies’ 
voluntarily disclosed spending, suggest a broad consensus among lawyers, 
accountants, and the SEC, that expenditures of this size are not material to 
shareholders. 
Shareholder materiality also differs from voter materiality because 
shareholder interests in corporate spending remain the same regardless of 
the type or location of the election.  This is because shareholder interests 
turn on the size of the expenditure in proportion to the company’s overall 
financial condition and not on the amount of spending necessary to 
influence a particular election.  Shareholders of a company with $10 billion 
in annual net income are unlikely to care about a $10,000 corporate 
expenditure, regardless of whether it constitutes a minor donation to a 
federal super PAC or the largest donation in a state ballot initiative contest. 
The political expenditures of Chevron in 2012 provide an example of 
how investor materiality plays out for large, politically active, publicly held 
 
 136. See, e.g., SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 41,151 (“The use of 
a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 5%, may provide the basis for a preliminary 
assumption that—without considering all relevant circumstances—a deviation of less than 
the specified percentage with respect to a particular item on the registrant’s financial 
statements is unlikely to be material.”).  Underscoring this 5 percent rule of thumb, Proxy 
Rule 14a-8 specifies that a reporting company can exclude a shareholder proposal relating to 
operations “which account for less than 5 percent of the company’s total assets at the end of 
its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for 
its most recent fiscal year,” if it is “not otherwise significantly related to the company’s 
business.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 137. Information about smaller expenditures also may be material to investors if it sheds 
light on other aspects of the corporation’s business that potentially affect the value of the 
company—such as information that an expenditure was made intentionally to violate the 
law.  However, lawful and otherwise unremarkable political expenditures that amount to far 
less than 5 percent of net income are unlikely to significantly alter the “total mix” of 
information already available to investors. 
 138. See, e.g., Political Contributions, GILEAD, http://investors.gilead.com/ 
phoenix.zhtml?c=69964&p=irol-contributions (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (providing 
political spending disclosure data of Gilead Sciences, Inc.). 
 139. In fact, only three publicly held companies made total donations that exceeded $1 
million to top-twenty super PACs in 2012. See Sarah C. Haan, Opaque Transparency:  
Outside Spending and Transparency by Privately-Held Business Entities in 2012 and 
Beyond, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1166 (2013).  The average total donation by a publicly 
held firm to top-twenty super PACs in calendar year 2012 was $217,352, and the median 
total donation was $50,000. Id. at 1165 n.51.  These figures do not account for election-
related contributions to nondisclosing 501(c) nonprofits, however, and thus do not provide a 
full picture of election-related spending by these companies. 
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companies.  FEC disclosure reports show that Chevron gave the largest 
super PAC donation in 2012 of all publicly held firms, in the amount of 
$2.5 million.140  Chevron also gave $3.16 million to other organizations that 
were politically active in the federal election that year, including $1 million 
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.141  Chevron’s political spending at the 
state and local level was even greater.  The company spent more than 
$6 million on state and local elections in California alone.142  Overall, 
Chevron spent $6,340,578 on state and local elections in eleven states, and 
additional funds on elections in Canada and Australia.143  Chevron’s total 
election-related expenditures for 2012 were just over $12 million.144 
Although $12 million is a lot of money, this amount falls far short of 
what most Chevron shareholders were likely to consider material in 2012 in 
the context of the company’s overall financial condition.  Chevron’s net 
income for 2012 was $26.179 billion.145  Five percent of this amount is 
slightly more than $1.3 billion—an amount greater than the total amount of 
reported outside spending in the 2012 federal election.146  Chevron’s 
$12 million in election-related spending amounted to less than 0.05 percent 
of net income for the company that year.  The company chose not to itemize 
election-related expenditures in its filings with the SEC, revealing the 
company’s view that its political expenditures were not material to 
investors. 
On a per-share basis, Chevron’s political spending in 2012 was 
miniscule.  At year end, Chevron had 1.933 billion stock shares 
outstanding, meaning it spent less than a hundredth of a cent per share to 
influence elections in 2012.147  Most shareholders would likely have 
considered these expenditures de minimis with respect to their own 
shareholding.148 
 
 140. See id. at 1166 n.54.  To be clear, FEC disclosures do not report corporate money 
channeled through 501(c) nonprofits. 
 141. See CHEVRON CORP., 2012 CHEVRON CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 4 
(2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/Political-
Contributions-2012.pdf. 
 142. See id. at 1–4 (disclosing over $6 million in corporate treasury expenditures related 
to state and local elections in California). 
 143. Chevron’s disclosure report also notes a $20,000 donation to “Better Schools for a 
Better Midland,” which is not linked to any state. See id. at 16. 
 144. The total of all expenditures reported on Chevron’s 2012 Chevron Corporate 
Political Contributions report was $12,020,578. See generally id. 
 145. See CHEVRON CORP., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2013), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/annualreport/Chevron2012AnnualReport.pdf. 
 146. See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of 
the 2011–2012 Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/pdf/20130419release.pdf (reporting nearly $7.13 billion 
in total spending from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012, including nearly $1.27 billion 
in independent expenditures and electioneering communications). 
 147. See CHEVRON CORP., supra note 145, at 57. 
 148. At Chevron’s annual shareholder meeting in May 2013, a shareholder submitted for 
vote a proposal directing Chevron’s board of directors to “refrain from using corporate funds 
to influence any political election.” CHEVRON CORP., NOTICE OF THE 2013 ANNUAL MEETING 
AND 2013 PROXY STATEMENT 80 (2013), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/Chevron2013ProxyStatement.pdf.  Although the 
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Nevertheless, Chevron published a separate, voluntary report for 2012 on 
its website, “Chevron Corporate Political Contributions.”149  The report’s 
sixteen pages disclosed hundreds of individual payments—to super PACs 
and 501(c) nonprofits, as well as to state and local candidates and 
committees—but did not total any of the payments, making the document 
difficult for investors to use.  And although the final report was released 
December 31, 2012, long after the year’s elections were decided, Chevron’s 
report did not disclose whether the candidates it supported won or lost—
information that might have helped investors understand if the company 
was using its political cash in a cost-effective way.  All of this suggests 
Chevron believed that information about its political spending held little 
interest for its shareholders. 
Even if a Chevron shareholder had a strong ideological preference that 
her money not be spent to promote the political interests favored by 
Chevron’s management, she would have to have owned more than $17,000 
in Chevron stock before the proportion of the company’s election-related 
expenditures attributable to her investment totaled $1.150  And this assumes 
the shareholder objected to all of Chevron’s election-related spending, 
rather than just a portion of it.151 
All of this means that voters are likely to care about thousands or even 
millions of dollars of corporate spending that shareholders would happily 
ignore.152  It is fair to say that, in the 2012 federal election, all disclosed 
spending by publicly held corporations failed to interest the great majority 
of their shareholders on a company-by-company basis, while at the same 
time it sparked significant public debate.153  
For this reason, voters should favor low campaign finance disclosure 
thresholds, and shareholders should favor high campaign finance disclosure 
thresholds, particularly for outside spending, which is the main sort of 
 
company had supported many candidates for federal office who lost—meaning that several 
million dollars of these expenditures were wasted, and may even have harmed the 
company’s access to the winning candidates—the proposal was defeated by 96.6 percent of 
votes. See CHEVRON CORP., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) 3 (May 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevron2013proxyvotingresults.pdf. 
 149. CHEVRON CORP., supra note 141.  Chevron removed this report from its website 
sometime in 2014. 
 150. This calculation uses Chevron’s year-end stock price of $108.14 per share.  At that 
price, a shareholder would have needed to own 161 shares of Chevron stock, at a total value 
of $17,410.54; on a per-share basis, $1 of the company’s election-related expenditures were 
attributable to her investment for 2012. 
 151. Chevron’s 2012 voluntary political spending disclosure shows that it donated to both 
Democratic and Republican candidates. 
 152. This is not to say that shareholders never care about small corporate expenditures.  
For example, a shareholder might desire disclosure of low-dollar spending if such spending 
serves as a signal that corporate management is engaged in insider expropriation of the 
firm’s political spending. See Michael D. Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies to 
Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593, 642–45. 
 153. See, e.g., Reity O’Brien & Andrea Fuller, Citizen United Ruling Opened Door to 
$933 Million in New Election Spending, NBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013, 2:09 AM), 
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/16/16530772-citizen-united-ruling-
opened-door-to-933-million-in-new-election-spending. 
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electoral spending that corporations engage in.  In fact, shareholder 
informational interests (but not voter interests) would justify different 
disclosure thresholds for corporations than for individuals.  In 2013, 
members of the South Dakota Senate introduced a bill that proposed 
separate disclosure thresholds for business entities that made independent 
expenditures in state elections.154  Under the bill as originally introduced, 
“[a]ny person or organization which is not a recognized business entity” 
was required to disclose independent expenditures of $100 or more, but the 
threshold applicable to a business entity was $2000.155  The separate 
corporate disclosure threshold ultimately was deleted from the bill that 
passed,156 but the fact that it found its way into the bill at all reveals the 
competing interests that are influencing the reshaping of disclosure rules at 
the state level. 
B.   The Timing of Corporate Spending Disclosure 
The timing of campaign finance disclosure affects its usefulness.  This 
section uses disclosure timing to explore how voters’ and shareholders’ 
competing informational interests may be served differently by procedural 
disclosure rules.  Voters generally need full disclosure of corporate 
spending before an election, while most shareholders are not only satisfied 
with post-election disclosure, but likely prefer it. 
Shareholders and voters differ significantly in their ability to use 
corporate spending disclosure.  Voters’ main use of campaign finance 
disclosure is to inform their decision making at the polls.  They can also use 
spending disclosure to monitor relationships of influence between donors 
and elected officials over time, but voters’ primary means of objecting to 
corruption, or to the appearance of corruption, is to vote the corrupted 
official out of office in the next election.  In their roles as consumers, voters 
may even be in a position to hold corporate donors accountable at the cash 
register through boycotts.  In contrast, shareholders have little opportunity 
to hold corporate managers and directors accountable for spending 
decisions, and these opportunities generally arise after the fact, many 
months after an election.  Shareholders who cannot vote in a jurisdiction in 
which a company seeks to influence an election have no opportunity to hold 
candidates or elected officials accountable.  And shareholders are unlikely 
to engage in consumer action against their own companies because this cuts 
against their financial interests.  When it comes to holding donors and 
recipients accountable for corporate spending and the influence it confers, 
political spending information has many potential uses for voters, and fewer 
uses for shareholders. 
 
 154. See S.B. 200, 2013 Leg. Assemb., 88th Sess. § 12-27-16(1)(3)–(4) (S.D. 2013). 
 155. See id. 
 156. Act of Mar. 20, 2013, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 67. 
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1.   Disclosure for Voters:  The First Tuesday in November 
Voters need to obtain spending disclosure before an election in order to 
factor it into their voting decisions.  In McConnell, the Supreme Court 
specifically endorsed the government’s interest in “mak[ing] the contents of 
parties’ disclosure statements available to curious voters in advance of 
elections.”157  This means that, in an election year, voters generally need 
up-to-date corporate spending information before the first Tuesday in 
November. 
Disclosure laws have long been designed to provide current campaign 
finance information to voters in the days before an election, but they tend to 
require swifter reporting of “direct” outside spending—which corporations 
rarely engage in158—than of “indirect” outside spending.  For example, in 
federal elections, up until the twentieth day before an election, “direct” 
outside spenders are required to report their expenditures to the FEC within 
forty-eight hours.159  During the last twenty days before an election, 
“direct” outside spenders must report expenditures of $1000 or more to the 
FEC within twenty-four hours.160  But super PACs must report 
contributions (including contributions from corporations) to the FEC either 
monthly or on a quarterly basis, and in a preelection report that captures all 
contributions and expenditures within twenty days prior to a general 
election.161  Under this regime, corporate donations to super PACs that are 
made after the twentieth day before the election are not reported until after 
the election, in a thirty day post–general election report.162  Thus, for the 
most common type of disclosed corporate electoral spending—donations to 
super PACs—voters can count on monthly reporting, with a final report 
twenty days before the election. 
Public disclosure can also allow voters (and other members of a 
community) to boycott companies whose electoral spending they oppose.  
To the extent that voters seek to use corporate disclosure to engage in 
consumer action, swift disclosure allows consumers to respond quickly and 
thereby discourage the company from making additional, similar 
expenditures in the same election cycle.  In some cases, consumer action 
has caused companies to publicly disclaim their donations or apologize for 
them,163 and if corporate apologies are prompted by a boycott, they are 
most powerful if they come in the midst of a campaign rather than after it.  
 
 157. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 200 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 158. See Haan, supra note 139, at 1160–61. 
 159. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.4(c) (2013). 
 160. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(d). 
 161. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR OTHER 
THAN AN AUTHORIZED COMMITTEE (FEC FORM 3X) 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm3xi.pdf. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See, e.g., Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to 
Political Contributions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2. 
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Thus, timely disclosure not only helps voters make decisions at the polls, 
but also helps them vote with their wallets. 
2.   Disclosure for Shareholders:  Proxy Season 
Shareholders do not need any corporate spending information before a 
public election.  Under corporate governance laws, shareholders have no 
opportunity to approve or object to corporate political expenditures ex 
ante.164  Swift, preelection disclosure of expenditures is thus not useful to 
shareholders because they can do little with it, other than divest completely.  
Shareholders who want to use the procedures of corporate democracy to 
regulate the corporation’s political spending must do so at the annual 
shareholder meeting, where they can vote to unseat a director or make a 
shareholder proposal directing management to change its future spending 
practices.  Thus, shareholders need corporate electoral spending information 
before the annual shareholder meeting, which at most publicly held 
companies is held during “proxy season” in the spring following an 
election.  From the point of view of shareholders, the most useful disclosure 
is not quick disclosure of a series of piecemeal expenditures as an election 
approaches, but rather comprehensive, post hoc disclosure that makes it 
easy to compare the company’s total electoral spending with its broader 
financial operations. 
Voluntary corporate disclosures, which are directed at shareholders, 
embody this purpose.  The CPA-Zicklin Index, which publishes a list of 
best practices for corporations regarding political spending, encourages 
corporations to make spending disclosures only twice a year.165  Most 
corporations that publish voluntary disclosures produce semiannual reports 
or a single, annual report summarizing the entire year’s spending 
activity.166  This is the practice because this timing of disclosure is user-
friendly for shareholders. 
Postelection disclosure is most useful to shareholders for another reason:  
it facilitates the comparison of the corporation’s expenditures with electoral 
outcomes.  Even if shareholders care little about the absolute amount of a 
 
 164. Iowa’s corporate laws provide a partial exception to this rule.  Under Iowa law, a 
corporation must obtain “the authorization of a majority of the entity’s board of directors” 
for “the use of treasury funds for an independent expenditure involving a candidate or ballot 
issue committee.”  The board’s authorization must occur “in the same calendar year in which 
the independent expenditure is incurred.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.404 (West 2012).  Since 
most corporations chartered in Iowa are non-public, closely held companies, this law 
probably functions to require shareholder approval in many cases. 
 165. See CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE 2013 CPA-ZICKLIN CENTER INDEX OF 
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE 23 app. C (2013), available at 
http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/8047. 
 166. In practice, corporations that publish voluntary reports often do not make them 
public until many months after the last date of the period being reported.  Thus, it is not 
unusual to see a company post a voluntary political spending report for the period ending 
June 30 in December.  This practice virtually ensures that, in an election year, shareholders 
will not learn about any of the corporation’s electoral spending from the company until after 
the election is decided.  The practice makes sense, and has caused little controversy, because 
shareholders have little interest in preelection disclosure. 
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corporation’s expenditures on an election167—as already discussed, 
shareholders of public companies are likely to consider current levels of 
corporate electoral spending immaterial because the spending is de minimis 
on a company-by-company basis—a shareholder may still be interested to 
learn if management made cost-effective spending decisions and backed 
winners.  This information can only be obtained after the election, by a 
comparison of total candidate-by-candidate expenditures to electoral 
outcomes.168 
Although it is probably not what the Supreme Court had in mind when it 
wrote about the “procedures of corporate democracy,” shareholders might 
also respond to corporate spending disclosure by exiting the corporation—
by selling their shares.  This is mainly an option for shareholders of 
publicly held companies, and not for shareholders of privately held 
companies, because there exists an efficient market for the shares of the 
former but often not for the latter.169  There is little evidence that 
shareholders commonly respond to corporate electoral spending disclosure 
by selling their shares.  However, a shareholder who wanted to do so would 
probably prefer to learn about the corporation’s expenditure soon after it 
was made, both to send a message to management and to cut ties to the 
corporation before additional, similar expenditures are made. 
All of this suggests that voters’ needs favor timely disclosure of 
expenditures as they are made and up-to-date disclosure before an election, 
while most shareholders will prefer to receive a single, postelection 
disclosure of corporate spending for the fiscal year, months after voters and 
the media have lost interest. 
C.   Other Legal Rights to Corporate Spending Information 
Voters depend more heavily upon campaign finance disclosure laws to 
learn about corporate electoral spending than shareholders do because, 
under state corporate law, shareholders are likely to enjoy legally 
enforceable rights to corporate political spending information that voters 
lack.  Most state corporate law statutes give special informational rights to 
shareholders that make campaign finance disclosure less important from the 
shareholder perspective.  Yet to use these corporate law informational 
rights, shareholders generally must safeguard the company’s financial 
 
 167. See supra Part III.A. 
 168. Interestingly, FECA’s advance disclosure requirements might be understood to serve 
shareholders’ informational interests uniquely.  This is because compelled disclosure of a 
corporation’s plan to engage in future political spending gives dissenting shareholders the 
opportunity to act ex ante on concerns about that spending, even if it is only by calling 
corporate management to register a complaint.  In effect, advance disclosure provides 
shareholders with some tool (rather than no tool) to influence, through informal pressure on 
management, a corporation’s political spending. 
 169. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority 
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO L.J. 1207, 1217–19 (2009).  
Moreover, privately held entities often impose transfer restrictions on ownership; for many 
such entities, limited exit is a desired feature of governance. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 1:9, at 1-36 (3d ed. 2014). 
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information from non-shareholders.  Thus, while voters must rely on 
campaign finance laws to provide them information about corporate 
electoral spending, shareholders have other legal rights to the information, 
and they are unlikely to share the information they obtain by right with the 
public. 
The idea that shareholder informational rights may extend to corporate 
political spending data that are not otherwise material under federal 
securities law first came to light after the 2012 election.  In January 2013, 
the New York State Comptroller, a shareholder of Qualcomm, Inc., sued 
Qualcomm to obtain information about Qualcomm’s political spending 
activities in the 2012 election.170  The New York State Comptroller 
advanced a novel legal theory, arguing that section 220 of Delaware’s 
General Corporation Law171 gave any stockholder the right to inspect the 
corporation’s books and records relating to political expenditures.172  
Qualcomm settled the lawsuit by agreeing to voluntarily disclose its 
political spending to the public, so the Comptroller’s argument remains 
untested.173  However, the plain text of section 220, and Qualcomm’s quick 
capitulation, suggest it is likely that Delaware law does give corporate 
shareholders a right to political spending information, and that similar laws 
in many states do the same.174 
State corporate laws that give shareholders an informational right to 
corporate spending information likely prohibit shareholders from sharing 
what they learn with people outside the company.  This is because state 
corporate laws generally require shareholders to establish a “proper 
purpose” to access corporate information and prohibit them from uses of the 
information that might harm the company.175  Courts have interpreted the 
“proper purpose” clause to protect sensitive corporate financial 
information.176  Because public disclosure of a company’s political 
spending may subject the company to criticism and so-called economic 
reprisal,177 courts are likely to conclude that shareholders who use their 
informational rights to publicize controversial corporate electoral spending 
practices are harming the company.  Thus, shareholders’ information rights, 
embodied in section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law and other 
 
 170. Nicholas Confessore, State Comptroller Sues Qualcomm for Data About Its Political 
Contributions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at A18. 
 171. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2011). 
 172. See Confessore, supra note 170. 
 173. See Nicholas Confessore, Qualcomm Reveals Its Donations to Tax-Exempt Groups, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/ 
qualcomm-agrees-to-reveal-donations-to-tax-exempt-groups/. 
 174. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1602(3) (West 2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 16.02(c)(1)–(3) (2013). 
 175. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c). 
 176. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate 
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 368 
n.205 (1996) (“[E]ven where the shareholder states a proper purpose, the Delaware courts 
will protect the corporation’s sensitive business information by restricting the information 
produced . . . .”). 
 177. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
2694 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
states’ similar laws, may provide shareholders with an enforceable right to 
obtain political spending information that must not be shared generally with 
voters. 
It stands to reason that shareholders will be satisfied with less exacting 
campaign finance disclosure laws than voters will, because they can obtain 
corporate spending information from another source.  For reasons discussed 
in the next section, they may prefer that some corporate spending 
information remain outside the public eye. 
D.   The Financial Interest in Limiting Disclosure 
Voters’ and shareholders’ interests in corporate spending information 
differ in a fourth important way:  shareholders have a financial interest in 
limiting public disclosure, and voters do not.  Voters require public 
disclosure to obtain corporate spending information.  It is certainly possible 
that onerous disclosure requirements could chill political speech and 
thereby reduce voters’ access to information, but there is little evidence of 
this.  Voters even may be interested in the reaction of the public to 
corporate spending disclosures and factor such information into their voting 
decisions. 
Shareholders’ interests are more complicated.  Public disclosure of the 
corporation’s electoral spending is often good for shareholders—when 
public disclosure serves as a channel for investor information, it allows 
shareholders to monitor management and reduce agency costs—but it also 
may lead to a reduction in shareholder value. 
A shareholder may reasonably fear that public disclosure could subject 
the company to controversy or to boycott, leading to a drop in revenues or 
even to a lower stock price.  In its 2010 Handbook of Corporate Political 
Activity, the Conference Board identified political spending as an “area of 
potential corporate vulnerability” because it involves reputational risk.178  
Ironically, the use of the internet for quick public dissemination of filings 
and for database synthesis of disclosure information is helpful to voters but 
poses risks to corporate donors, because it makes it easier for regulators and 
the public to monitor for violations of campaign finance laws.  A 
corporation’s violation of campaign finance regulations can result in fines, 
as well as reputational harm.179 
Public disclosure of a company’s political expenditures may, in some 
circumstances, reveal the company’s business strategy to competitors.180  
For example, a retailer might not want competitors to know that it has 
begun spending money to support candidates in an area where it has no 
stores, because this could indicate the retailer’s intention to open a store 
 
 178. CONFERENCE BD., HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY:  EMERGING 
GOVERNANCE ISSUES 17 (2010), available at http://www.politicalaccountability.net/ 
index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/id/4084. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL 
EXPENDITURES:  2011 BENCHMARK REPORT ON S&P 500 COMPANIES 4 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959566. 
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there.  Likewise, disclosure of a corporation’s donations to support or 
oppose a ballot initiative can tip the corporation’s hand to competitors about 
its plans with regard to labor, taxes, or any number of business-related 
subjects. 
Shareholders have a financial interest in limiting the company’s expense 
to comply with disclosure obligations, such as ongoing reporting 
requirements.  The costs of complying with disclosure laws can be high, 
and involve not only the expense of recordkeeping, but the cost of 
monitoring disclosure laws in multiple jurisdictions.181 
The concerns raised about the costs of campaign finance disclosure to 
businesses in these and other cases are very similar to the concerns raised 
by businesses, securities regulators, and commentators about the costs of 
disclosure mandated by the federal securities laws.  In a speech to the 
National Association of Corporate Directors in 2013, SEC Chairwoman 
Mary Jo White cautioned that when disclosure “strays from its core 
purpose,” investors experience “information overload,” and she suggested 
that disclosure obligations should be pared back.182  In December 2013, the 
SEC issued a staff report about disclosure to Congress that raised questions 
about the usefulness of various types of securities disclosure and concluded 
that the issue warranted further study.183  The SEC has continued to raise 
concerns that companies may be overburdened by disclosure requirements, 
and in some recent instances it has expressly urged companies to reduce 
their disclosures to make them easier for investors to use.184 
*     *     * 
The four examples above highlight specific ways in which voters and 
shareholders have different informational needs that are satisfied by 
different kinds of campaign finance disclosure.  Taken together, they show 
that a campaign finance disclosure regime guided by voter primacy is likely 
to mandate swift, preelection disclosure of corporate electoral spending, 
with low disclosure thresholds for outside spending as well as for 
contributions.  In contrast, a disclosure regime guided by shareholder 
primacy would have high disclosure thresholds, particularly for outside 
 
 181. For example, in 2013, in Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 
(8th Cir. 2013), the Eighth Circuit invalidated “perpetual, ongoing” disclosure obligations 
that applied to corporations that spent money to influence elections in the state, noting that 
they could be “particularly difficult . . . for smaller businesses . . . .” Id. at 596–97 (quoting 
Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
 182. White, supra note 20 (“I am raising the question here and internally at the SEC as to 
whether investors need and are optimally served by the detailed and lengthy disclosures 
about all of the topics that companies currently provide in the reports they are required to 
prepare and file with us.”). 
 183. See SEC, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K 
95–96 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-
requirements-review.pdf. 
 184. See, e.g., Tammy Whitehouse, SEC:  Trim Excess Data from Financial Reports, 
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Mar. 2014, at 33 (reporting that SEC deputy chief accountant Dan 
Murdock had “called on companies to do what they can . . . to reduce disclosures in the body 
of the financial statements and in the footnotes”). 
2696 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
spending, and summary postelection disclosure.  It might even have 
separate disclosure thresholds for businesses.  And it would be highly 
sensitive to the costs of regular recordkeeping and reporting obligations for 
businesses large and small. 
These competing interests cannot be achieved through the same set of 
disclosure rules.  Because voters’ and shareholders’ informational interests 
demand different types of disclosure, optimal disclosure for one audience 
will be suboptimal for the other.  The consequence is that, after Citizens 
United, lawmakers and regulators who draft or amend campaign finance 
disclosure rules that apply to corporations must compromise.  Expanding 
the audience for campaign finance disclosure to include shareholders is thus 
unlikely to lead to more disclosure that is helpful to more additional 
categories of stakeholders.  Instead, it is likely to lead to a refocusing of 
disclosure priorities away from the needs of voters, and ultimately to less 
disclosure that is helpful to voters. 
III.   THE IMPLICATIONS OF REPURPOSING 
CORPORATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 
In an election, a nexus exists between whose interests campaign finance 
disclosure serves and whose political interests are likely to be advanced at 
the polls.  If disclosure laws are well designed to meet voters’ informational 
needs, voters will be able to easily obtain information they find useful in 
making voting decisions, and they will be more effective at voting in a way 
that promotes their political interests and policy preferences.  Conversely, if 
voters cannot obtain information that would help them decide among 
competing candidates, ballot initiatives, or referenda, they will be less 
effective at advancing their political interests when they vote.  Both the 
content and the manner of disclosures impact the effectiveness with which 
disclosure serves voters’ interests.185  As we have seen, voters and 
shareholders have competing interests in the content and manner of 
corporate electoral spending disclosure, and since Citizens United has 
repurposed this type of disclosure to serve both audiences, campaign 
finance disclosure laws will be reshaped over time to satisfy shareholders’ 
informational interests at the expense of voters. 
In this final part, I argue that the Court’s move in Citizens United to 
repurpose campaign finance disclosure is likely to have at least three 
results.  First, it will enhance the political power of a small number of very 
wealthy individuals at the expense of lower-income Americans.  This is 
because stockholding in U.S. public companies skews strongly toward the 
very wealthy.  Second, in some states but not in others, changes to 
disclosure will strengthen the power of shareholder groups that lack any ties 
to the community, enhancing the political influence of exclusively profit-
driven interests. 
Finally, the move to expand the audience for corporate electoral 
disclosure may have constitutional consequences for campaign finance.  
 
 185. See Mayer, supra note 96, at 259. 
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Shareholder interests may increase in importance in the First Amendment 
analysis justifying compelled campaign finance disclosure by for-profit 
businesses because the Court has been weakening voters’ interests in source 
revelation.  If shareholders’ interests take on greater significance in the 
constitutional analysis and corporate electoral spending disclosure were to 
become available via another disclosure channel—for example, through 
securities disclosure rules that the SEC is being pressed to create186—the 
informational interest supporting corporate campaign finance disclosure 
could be weakened or even eliminated.  Corporate electoral spending 
disclosure could migrate from the authority of the FEC and state election 
agencies to the authority of securities regulators, furthering the investor-
centric focus of rules governing its form and substance. 
Fundamentally, voters and corporate shareholders are different interest 
groups.  Not all voters own stock, and not all stockholders vote.  Some 
Americans are both eligible to vote and own stock in U.S. companies, but it 
is difficult to estimate the size of this group with precision.187  Recent 
surveys have found that fewer than half of adult Americans are beneficial 
owners of any corporate stock.188  This suggests that fewer than 120 million 
adult Americans were stockholders at the time of the 2012 election.  By 
comparison, almost 222 million Americans were eligible to vote in that 
election.189  Although we must paint with a broad brush, these facts suggest 
that the population of individuals in 2012 who were eligible to vote in the 
federal election and owned zero corporate stock may have reached as high 
as 100 million Americans.  Most stockholders of U.S. public companies are 
probably eligible to vote in the United States, but only slightly more than 
half of eligible voters in the United States probably own at least one share 
of stock in a U.S. public company. 
These observations tell us nothing, however, about the demographics of 
the typical stockholding voter versus the typical non-stockholding voter.  
Because anyone who owns even a single share of stock might be placed in 
the shareholder category, these statistics fail to shed light on other key 
questions:  How many shareholders own enough stock of a particular 
 
 186. See, e.g., Petition for Rulemaking from Comm. on Disclosure of Corporate Political 
Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Petition for 
Rulemaking], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf. 
 187. The author is unaware of any scholarship that has quantified the number of 
Americans who are both eligible to vote in federal elections and own stock in U.S. public 
companies. 
 188. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 392 (12th ed. 
2012) (finding that, in 2010, 46.9 percent of U.S. households owned any stock); William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
489, 515 (2013) (“Stockholding households increased from just over 30% in 1989 to over 
53% in 2001 and dropped back to just under 50% by 2010 . . . .”); Alec Tyson, Economic 
Recovery Favors the More-Affluent Who Own Stocks, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 31, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/31/stocks-and-the-recovery-majority-of-
americans-not-invested-in-the-market/. 
 189. 2012 November General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, 
http://www.electproject.org/2012g (last updated Sept. 3, 2014).  These figures exclude 
noncitizen residents of the United States and ineligible felons, and include overseas residents 
who are eligible to vote. 
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corporation that they identify with its political interests?  How many 
shareholders have sufficient wealth invested in stock that they identify as 
part of the investor class?  The identification question is important because 
only a small proportion of stockholders are likely to share the unique 
political interests of investors, and even fewer are likely to own sufficient 
stock to actually influence a particular corporation’s behavior through the 
“procedures of corporate democracy.” 
Since Citizens United, disclosure rules have become the main 
battleground for campaign finance reform.190  There has been increased 
legislative activity to enact and amend state disclosure laws, as well as 
increased litigation challenging campaign finance disclosure.  Through this 
legislative activity and litigation, campaign finance disclosure rules are 
evolving.  Now is the right time to consider critical questions of audience 
with regard to our campaign finance disclosure regime. 
Part IV of Citizens United must be understood as part of a broad trend in 
corporate disclosure that goes well beyond campaign finance law.  The 
trend reflects deep ambivalence about how we regulate corporate activity 
and particularly about who the audience should be for various types of 
corporate disclosure.  It has emerged because lawmakers are increasingly 
relying on disclosure to stand in for substantive regulation of corporate 
activity.  Yet there is little clarity about how disclosure is supposed to 
regulate corporations through private ordering.  Does “deregulate and 
disclose” work through the disclosure of information to people inside the 
corporation—investors—who are then supposed to use the information to 
regulate corporate behavior?  Or does it work through the dissemination of 
information to people outside the corporation—consumers, employees, 
citizens—who are supposed to use the information in deciding what to buy, 
where to work, and how to vote?  Since disclosure cannot serve all 
audiences equally well, the substitution of disclosure for regulation of 
corporate activity raises serious questions of audience. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act191 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”), enacted by Congress in 2010, exemplifies the 
disclosure audience problem in the domain of securities regulation.  
Securities disclosure, which traditionally has been investor focused, 
increasingly is being repurposed to provide corporate information to the 
general public.  Among its several reforms, the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
the SEC to compel public disclosure of corporate information relating to 
CEO compensation, resource extraction payments, “conflict” minerals, and 
 
 190. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 96, at 255 (stating that after Citizens United, “supporters 
of campaign finance regulation are turning more and more to disclosure rules to police 
campaign fundraising and spending”). 
 191. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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mine safety.192  The purposes behind these new disclosure requirements 
have little to do with investor education.193 
Regulators’ and courts’ hostility to Dodd-Frank’s expanded audience for 
securities disclosure has led some to conclude that the solution is to reduce 
disclosure.194  Regulators have asserted that securities disclosure on 
subjects of primary interest to the general public potentially “overloads” 
investors with excess information.195  In 2013, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia threw out the public disclosure component of the 
SEC’s Resource Extraction Rule, and the D.C. Circuit held that the Conflict 
Minerals Rule violated corporations’ First Amendment rights against 
compelled speech.196  These regulators and courts have succeeded in 
squelching the disclosure mandated by Dodd-Frank in part because 
Congress did not clearly define the audience for those disclosures. 
Ultimately, the problem of audience for corporate disclosure has been 
driven by advances in information technology, which make it possible for 
intermediaries to easily obtain and report on a wide range of corporate 
disclosures on the internet, where new audiences find and use the 
information.  Thus, campaign finance disclosure reports published on the 
FEC’s website, or environmental disclosures published on the EPA’s 
website, are easily incorporated into reports for investors; financial and 
environmental disclosure information contextualizes corporate electoral 
spending information for voters.  Information technology advances have 
dramatically lowered the costs for shareholders to obtain corporate 
campaign finance disclosure information, but it does not necessarily follow 
that corporate campaign finance disclosure should be redesigned with the 
purpose of addressing shareholders’ informational needs. 
 
 192. See, e.g., id. § 953, 124 Stat. at 1903–04 (proposed CEO-Pay Ratio Rule); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13q-1 (2013) (Resource Extraction Rule); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (Conflict Minerals 
Rule); 17 C.F.R. § 229.104 (Mining Safety Rule). 
 193. See, e.g., Daniel S. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at SEC Historical Society 
2014 Annual Meeting:  On the 80th Anniversary of the SEC (June 5, 2014), available at 
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disclosure to include shareholders is likely to lead to a decrease in disclosure useful to 
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 195. White, supra note 20. 
 196. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (vacating the 
Resource Extraction Rule); see also Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir. 
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2700 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
A.   Wealth and Demographics 
Voters and corporate shareholders are likely to have different political 
interests and policy preferences.  Stockholding Americans are more likely 
to be white, male, and older than non-stockholding Americans, and more 
likely to identify as Republican.197  Americans who own stock are also 
likely to be better educated and wealthier than those who do not.  Stock 
ownership in the United States is highly concentrated in the college 
educated:  77 percent of college-educated Americans own stock, while only 
25 percent of those who have not attended college do.198 
Stock ownership skews strongly toward the wealthy.  Three-quarters of 
Americans with incomes over $80,000 own stock, while only a very small 
proportion—15 percent—of those with income less than $30,000 own 
stock.199  Wealthier individuals tend to own more stock, particularly stock 
owned directly rather than in a retirement account.  In 2010, the wealthiest 
5 percent of U.S. households owned more than 67 percent of U.S. stock, 
and almost 80 percent of U.S. stock that was not held in retirement 
accounts.200  Less than a third of American households owned more than 
$10,000 in stock, and the great majority of these stockholdings were in 
retirement accounts.201 
Demographic differences between stockholding Americans (as a group) 
and voters (as a group) likely are amplified when we distinguish between 
all eligible voters and those who actually go to the polls.  Commentators 
have noted that a “strong positive correlation” exists between the likelihood 
that an individual will go to the polls and her income and education level.202  
The content of disclosure may exacerbate this effect, because eligible voters 
probably feel more invested in an election when they find the campaign 
finance disclosure available to them relevant and helpful.  They feel 
confident that they understand the competing interests and have the 
informational tools to decide among them, and thus are probably more 
likely to cast a vote at all. 
 
 197. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 188, at 521 (reviewing available data and concluding 
that “the modal shareholder is rich, old, and white”); Tyson, supra note 188.  Stock 
ownership is highest among Americans between the ages of fifty and sixty-four (57 percent), 
and next highest among those between thirty and forty-nine (53 percent). Id.  Fewer than a 
quarter of American adults between eighteen and twenty-nine own stock (24 percent). Id. 
 198. See id.; see also Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 
2010:  Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RESERVE BULL., June 2012, at 
28 tbl.6 (in 2010, only 2.2 percent of households whose head had not graduated from high 
school owned stock directly, compared to 27.2 percent of households headed by a college 
graduate). 
 199. Tyson, supra note 188. 
 200. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 188, at 387–88 (noting that “[e]xcluding stocks held in 
retirement accounts, the typical wealth holder—represented by households in the middle 
fifth—owns next to nothing in stock, just $1,700”). 
 201. Id. at 392; Bricker et al., supra note 198, at 41 (finding that, in 2010, the median 
value of stock owned directly or indirectly by families in the bottom 20 percent of household 
income was $5300). 
 202. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1725 (1999). 
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Ultimately, because shareholders are disproportionately white, male, 
older, well-educated, and wealthy, we can expect that changes in the 
content and manner of disclosure that make it easier for shareholders to 
advance their political interests will disproportionately benefit these interest 
groups.  The most significant advantage is likely to go to the very wealthy, 
because stockholding skews most strongly by wealth, particularly when we 
consider the value of stock owned.  Very wealthy individuals share an 
interest in laws and policies that tend to entrench their wealth, for example 
by lowering tax rates on investment income.203  It is unfortunate that the 
Court’s move to expand the audience for corporate electoral spending 
disclosure is likely to empower the rich at the expense of the poor during a 
time of rising income inequality in the United States.  We must therefore 
consider the politically destabilizing effects of this expansion. 
The political empowerment of shareholders of U.S. companies means the 
political empowerment of wealthy foreigners as well as wealthy Americans.  
Shareholders are not merely a subset of voters.  Foreign ownership of U.S. 
equity stocks has grown steadily since the 1960s and stands today at more 
than 10 percent.204  Although foreign shareholders are ineligible to vote in 
any federal, state, or local election, their economic interests in corporate 
profit maximization will be advanced through the American political 
process in two ways:  (1) as disclosure laws evolve to serve their 
informational needs as shareholders, allowing them to take action within the 
corporation to promote their interests, and (2) by empowering fellow 
shareholders who vote to do so in a way that advances the corporation’s 
agenda.  Because this is true, we can expect to see a political shift that 
favors not only the interests of very wealthy Americans, but also those of 
foreign nationals who own U.S. stocks, at the expense of the interests of 
lower-income Americans.205 
B.   Geographic Effects 
Stock ownership is also concentrated in certain geographic areas of the 
United States.  Direct stockholding is more common among households in 
the Northeast and the West, and less common among households in the 
Midwest and South.206  Stockholding is also much more common among 
those who live in urban areas than in those who live in rural areas.207  Even 
shareholders who are eligible voters in a U.S. state cannot vote in more 
 
 203. See Noveck, supra note 45, at 81 (“[W]ealthy citizens often have a strong incentive 
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than one state; spending disclosures show that many for-profit companies 
make expenditures to influence elections in multiple states.  When it comes 
to state and local elections, because of the diffuse stock ownership that 
characterizes many large companies, it is likely that only a minority of 
shareholders at a company seeking to influence a state or local election will 
actually be eligible to vote in that election.  In some states this minority 
may be significantly larger than in others.  It is possible, of course, for a 
corporation to seek to influence an election in a state or locality where it has 
no shareholders eligible to vote (and no employees or operations, for that 
matter). 
This means that some states and local communities are likely to have 
fewer stockholding citizens than others.  In poorer, rural places in the South 
and Midwest, public companies are likely to have few shareholders who are 
also citizens or community members.  In these places, most shareholders of 
politically active corporations are likely to care about local political issues 
only insofar as they affect the corporation’s profitability.  These 
corporations have fewer shareholders to object if the corporation seeks to 
influence elections to pursue profits at the expense of civic goals. 
In contrast, in urban jurisdictions, particularly in the Northeast and West, 
public companies will experience greater shareholder backlash when they 
spend money to influence elections with the single-minded purpose of 
maximizing profits, because these companies have a disproportionate 
number of shareholders who live, work, and vote in these places.  In these 
areas, a high proportion of these corporations’ shareholders will view the 
corporation’s political activities in light of other civic and community-based 
interests, and the corporation’s pursuit of profit maximization will be 
mediated by its shareholders’ more broadly based interests.  It is also 
reasonable to assume that shareholders who live, work, and vote in electoral 
areas where their corporation is politically active will pay greater attention 
to the corporation’s political activity there. 
C.   The First Amendment and Competing Channels of Disclosure 
The Roberts Court’s recent campaign finance jurisprudence suggests that 
the main governmental interest that can justify disclosure laws is an 
informational interest, and several Justices have expressed skepticism that 
voters have legitimate informational interests in some kinds of spending 
disclosure, particularly those that provide source revelation.  Shareholder 
informational interests provide an alternative justification for laws that 
compel disclosure of corporate independent expenditures.  Thus, if the 
Court’s recent opinions are any clue, it is likely that the First Amendment 
analysis of corporate electoral spending disclosure will evolve to place 
greater emphasis on shareholders’ informational interests. 
If this happens, the constitutional basis for compelled corporate spending 
information may collapse if corporate electoral spending data becomes 
available through another channel.  In fact, the groundwork for this is 
already being laid.  Since 2011, the SEC has received repeated demands 
that it craft political spending disclosure rules for reporting companies 
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under the federal securities laws.208  If and when the SEC does mandate 
corporate political spending disclosure, the important governmental interest 
in using campaign finance laws to disseminate the same information will 
disintegrate, and campaign finance disclosure of corporate spending may 
become vulnerable to constitutional challenge.  Challengers will argue that 
campaign finance law need not mandate corporate spending disclosure if 
SEC rules already serve this purpose, and may further argue that 
overlapping disclosure regimes are so burdensome and costly to companies 
that they violate the First Amendment.  Thus, the final result of expanding 
the constitutionally cognizable audience for corporate spending disclosure 
in election law to include shareholders may be the end of corporate 
spending disclosure in election law.  If corporate electoral spending 
disclosure were to become the domain of securities regulators rather than 
election regulators, it would be governed exclusively by laws designed for 
investor protection, and enforced by regulatory authorities who are experts 
in, and primarily concerned with, the provision of information to investors. 
CONCLUSION 
In part IV of Citizens United, the Supreme Court did something 
pathbreaking and, ultimately, something harmful to campaign finance 
disclosure, and to corporate disclosure at the system level.  By suggesting 
that corporate electoral spending disclosure laws may be justified, at least in 
part, by a “sufficiently important” governmental interest in providing 
corporate expenditure data to investors, the Court weakened what I have 
called “voter primacy.”  Voter primacy is the idea, less obvious today than 
it was five years ago, that campaign finance disclosure is for voters, and 
should be designed to serve the exclusive informational needs of the 
citizenry. 
I have argued that the Court’s expansion of the audience for corporate 
campaign finance disclosure is not likely to lead to an expansion of 
corporate spending disclosure.  To the contrary, by pushing disclosure 
thresholds higher, disclosure deadlines later, and by heightening the 
sensitivity of lawmakers, regulators, and courts to the costs of disclosure to 
corporations, this neglected passage of Citizens United is likely to lead to 
less useful disclosure for voters.  This, in turn, is likely to favor the political 
interests of wealthy business owners, here and abroad, above the interests of 
average Americans.  For this reason, and because corporate and securities 
law are the proper domains for investor-focused disclosure, the Supreme 
Court should retreat from the path of Citizens United.  Voter primacy has 
long guided the design of our campaign finance laws, as well as their 
judicial review under the First Amendment, and it should continue to do so. 
 
 
 208. See, e.g., Letter from Seventeen U.S. Senators to Mary Jo White, SEC Chair (Jan. 9, 
2014), available at http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Senate%20Letter%20to%20SEC%20on%20Political%20Spending%20Disclosure%20Reg%
20Agenda%202014-01-09.pdf; Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 186. 
